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The Economics of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Poor Countries

Edward Miguel, University of California, Berkeley
Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak, Yale University
August 31, 2021

Abstract: The COVID-19 pandemic has upended health and living standards around
the world. This article provides an interim overview of these effects, with a particular
focus on low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). Economists have explained how
the pandemic is likely to have differential consequences for LMICs, and demand distinct
policy responses, compared to rich countries. We survey the rapidly expanding body of
empirical research that documents its many adverse economic and non-economic
effects in terms of living standards, education, health, and gender equality, which
appear to be unprecedented in depth and scale. We also review research on successful
and failed policy responses, including the failure to ensure widespread vaccine
coverage in LMICs, which is needed to end the pandemic. We close with a discussion
of implications for public policy in LMICs, and for the institutions of international
governance, given the likelihood of future pandemics and other major shocks (e.g.,
climate).
Keywords: COVID-19; Pandemic; Economic Development; Public Health; Low- and
middle-income countries (LMICs).
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1. Introduction
While the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic is global in scale, poor and
rich countries have experienced the crisis very differently. This article aims to document
the COVID-19 pandemic experience of residents of low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs), with a principal focus on its economic consequences and associated policy
responses. It covers both conceptual issues -- including whether public health and
social safety net policy responses should differ in LMICs compared to rich countries -as well as the emerging empirical facts, such as the adverse effects of the pandemic on
living standards, gender equality and other outcomes in LMIC populations.
We aim to be comprehensive but face several important limitations worth flagging. The
first and most important limitation relates to timing: we write this article as the pandemic
rages and new variants are emerging, changing the virus’ transmissibility and lethality.
While there has been an explosion of research on COVID-19 across disciplines, which
we attempt to distill here, the pandemic remains a fluid situation -- as is the state of
research about it -- and there are possibly still many twists and turns ahead regarding
how it will play out. As a result, our discussion is necessarily tentative and incomplete. 1
Nonetheless, we see value in summarizing what has been learned to date, both to
provide insight to researchers and policymakers today, and as a snapshot of scholarly
thinking in the midst of this unprecedented crisis.

1

The appendix contains a more complete listing of existing studies, beyond what is directly discussed in
this chapter. For further information, note that, together with partners, the Innovations for Poverty Action
(IPA) Research for Effective COVID-19 Responses (RECOVR) Tracker maintains an up-to-date list of
studies on COVID-19’s socioeconomic impacts: https://www.poverty-action.org/recovr.
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The article is also simultaneously broader and narrower in scope than many other
Annual Review contributions. The piece is broader in that we dive more deeply into the
“gray” research literature -- for instance, from NGO reports and public policy briefs,
media opinion pieces, and journalistic accounts in some cases -- than is typical for an
academic review. This is a necessity given how rapidly the pandemic situation is
changing and how much of the relevant work has not yet been published in standard
academic outlets. The article is also narrower than we would like: while the pandemic
has touched all aspects of our lives, we lack the space to cover all relevant economic
and societal issues. In particular, there are multiple important political economy topics -regarding political stability, democratic transitions, and conflict (Barrett, Chen, and Li
2021), as well as pandemic misinformation -- that we are unable to cover.
Our review of the burgeoning literature on the economics of COVID-19 in LMICs has
yielded useful insights and facts. While there is broad agreement among public health
experts that widespread vaccination coverage is the best way to end this pandemic,
vaccine distribution among LMICs populations remains incredibly limited, over half a
year after mass distribution began in the United States, United Kingdom and some other
wealthy countries (Tregoning et al. 2021). At the time of writing (August 2021), only
1.2% of people in Sub-Saharan Africa -- the world’s poorest region -- have been fully
vaccinated. In our opinion, the stark difference in access to lifesaving COVID-19
vaccines between poor and rich countries is not only a moral outrage, but also a
strategic error: the virus can mutate and become more virulent as billions of people in
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LMICs remain unvaccinated, and those new variants then spread to rich countries,
perhaps prolonging the pandemic for years.
Improving vaccination rates will require addressing gaps in supply, of course, but also
preparing for last-mile delivery problems and vaccine hesitancy in LMICs (although the
recent experience with HIV/AIDS shows these can be tackled, Nachega et al. 2021).
Until then, non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) like mask distribution remain a key
weapon in the arsenal to stem the spread of COVID-19, and prevent already-weak
healthcare systems in LMICs from becoming overwhelmed. That requires large-scale
behavioral change that has been a stubbornly difficult challenge in all countries -- poor
and rich alike -- and as a result, many LMIC governments have resorted to periodic
lockdowns to control the virus. Yet these lockdowns have imposed large-scale
economic, social, psychological and even health costs, especially in LMICs with weak
distribution systems for economic relief and where large shares of the population work
in the informal sector outside of the official government social safety net.
An accumulating body of evidence indicates that the adverse effects of the pandemic -both in terms of COVID-19 morbidity and mortality itself, and the damage caused by
lockdowns -- extend far beyond the immediate economic effects, as bad as they are.
There are distributional consequences with disproportionately adverse effects for
women, low-income and migrant workers, and other vulnerable groups, and broader
effects on other welfare metrics including educational progress, access to healthcare,
mental health, and the risk of domestic violence. While speculative, it seems likely that
the pandemic’s negative economic consequences will persist for years to come.
3
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The article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses key conceptual issues, with a
particular focus on how underlying differences across poor and rich countries may
influence both pandemic impacts and the design of appropriate policy responses.
Section 3 provides an overview of global patterns of COVID-19 infection and mortality.
Section 4 surveys empirical work on pandemic effects on living standards and food
security (mainly based on household surveys), as well as national accounts evidence
suggesting that the global COVID-19 recession is the largest since World War II.
Section 5 extends this discussion to education, health access and mental health, and
outcomes among migrant populations and women. Section 6 presents lessons about
effective policy, including behavioral insights regarding NPI adoption.
The final section looks forward, both to the hoped-for end of the pandemic and beyond
to lessons for future crises. In the context of a global pandemic, it is apparent that policy
decisions made in one part of the world affect all others. Given the magnitude of the
crisis, we argue that greatly expanded assistance from rich to poor countries would be
needed -- both in terms of vaccines and financial resources -- to address the twin health
and economic crises in LMICs today. The pandemic has also made it painfully obvious
-- if the climate crisis had not already done so -- that current institutions of international
governance are not well designed to achieve the collective action needed to provide
global public goods, such as effective pandemic preparedness and response.
2. Conceptual issues for Analyzing the Economics of COVID-19 in LMICs
An unusual attribute of COVID-19, relative to other recent viral epidemics like Ebola or
Zika, is that this pandemic mainly hit richer countries first. The virus was already
4
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widespread in South Korea, Italy, and then in the United Kingdom and the United
States, before its effects were directly felt in any LMIC other than China, where it
originated. In fact, migrants returning from richer countries in Europe and East Asia
evidently brought the virus into South Asia (Lee et al. 2021; Ahsan et al. 2020). As a
result, much early policy analysis centered around the experience of rich countries and
the policy strategies they should pursue to contain the virus. An influential Imperial
College epidemiological model (Ferguson et al. 2020), calibrated to U.K. data, was the
basis for widely-publicized social distancing guidelines (Fink 2020; Boseley 2020), This
model predicted that without flattening the curve of infections through social distancing
and lockdowns, the demand for hospital beds or ventilators could exceed the health
system’s capacity. An overwhelmed health system unable to provide care for either
COVID or other non-COVID medical issues would lead to excess, unnecessary deaths.
This policy discussion on “flattening the curve” captured the attention of major
international media (Roberts 2020; The Economist 2020). Even though the data
underlying this analysis was most relevant for rich countries in Western Europe and
North America, the benefits of social distancing became the dominant policy narrative
influencing lockdown decisions everywhere, including in LMICs. Countries like India
hurriedly instituted lockdowns, sometimes with harsh unintended consequences on
migrants and informal workers stranded in the city without jobs or housing (Barker et al.
2020; Abi-Habib and Yasir 2020; Pandey 2020).

5
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Economics research contributed to this policy discussion in at least three ways. Here we
provide a high-level summary of a few contributions; refer to Appendix Table A1 for a
more complete list of studies that we do not have room to elaborate on here.
First, economists conducted cost-benefit analyses of social distancing policy by
estimating the monetary value of the lives saved from bringing the virus under control,
so that this value can be directly compared against the GDP losses from lockdowns. In
an early contribution, Greenstone and Nigam (2020) applied the value of statistical life
(VSL) methodology on epidemiological projections of life-years saved through social
distancing in the US, to estimate that the reduction in mortality is worth $7.9 trillion,
which exceeded any reasonable projections of GDP losses from lockdowns. They
conclude that aggressive social distancing in rich countries is economically sensible.
A second, related contribution from economists was to model the tradeoffs of
implementing alternative forms of social distancing to provide guidance to policymakers.
Acemoglu et al. (2020) added GDP loss projections and age-specific COVID mortality
rates to the workhorse epidemiological Susceptible, Infected and Recovered (SIR)
model to argue that targeted lockdowns for vulnerable groups (e.g., the elderly) and
curbing contact across age groups can limit mortality while preserving economic output
better than blanket lockdowns.
Third, economists also conducted empirical analysis to evaluate the actual effects of
NPIs like social distancing on COVID infections. Using event-study designs, Hsiang et
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al. (2020) show that imposing social distancing in China, South Korea, Italy, Iran,
France and the US slowed COVID spread, averting an estimated 495 million infections.
Isolating the causal effects of COVID response policies is methodologically difficult
because the decision to impose mobility restrictions will itself respond to emerging virus
threats. Appendix Figure A1 makes clear how lockdowns were made more restrictive in
the US, UK, Brazil and New Zealand exactly when COVID fatalities started rising.
Figure 1 illustrates the interplay between patterns of COVID fatality rates and the
stringency of government policy responses (Hale et al 2021) for a range of LMICs and
high-income countries (HICs). It is evident that policy choices have varied widely, even
across countries within the same income category. New Zealand, Argentina, and India
imposed the strictest possible lockdowns early in the pandemic, but the US, UK and
Brazil did not. This allowed New Zealand to crush the virus, which in turn allowed a
much quicker reopening once local transmission was eliminated. In contrast, both the
virus remained in circulation, and mobility remained depressed for much longer, in
response to the half-hearted distancing attempts in the US and UK (Mobarak 2021).
Geography and luck also play important roles: Argentina (and Uruguay) experienced a
second wave much later despite their strict early lockdowns, possibly due to their
proximity to Brazil, where a new variant of the coronavirus emerged. India maintained a
low fatality rate for months after its initial lockdown2 -- with experts struggling to explain
its success (Mukherjee 2021) -- only to be hit by a massive spike in fatalities a full year
after the pandemic started, again linked to a new virus variant.
2

The official COVID-19 mortality statistics in India have been disputed; see Anand, Sandefur, and
Subramanian 2021.
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In addition to the early economic analysis, parallel discussions in the international news
media were also heavily focused on rich countries, where we learned about South
Korea’s impressive testing and contact tracing strategies (juxtaposed against the failure
of the US to implement the same (Parodi et al. 2020; Fisher and Sang-Hun 2020),
smartphone-based tracking of virus spread in Israel (Lubell 2020), and the emerging
politics around lockdowns, masking, and anti-science attitudes in Europe and North
America (Romm 2020). While interesting, this was not the most directly relevant
information for LMIC policymakers. If the COVID testing infrastructure is virtually
non-existent, sophisticated contact tracing procedures cannot be implemented. In
places where mask-wearing makes no political statement, policymakers need to focus
on other factors driving behavior change. Lost in that media shuffle were the indigenous
frugal innovations that West African and Central American countries had developed
when dealing with the Ebola and Zika epidemics (Meriggi and Mobarak 2020). It might
have helped for South Asians to learn about these strategies rather than rush to follow
UK or US policy guidelines.3
There are several reasons why the early economic analysis -- inspired by models and
data from rich countries -- was not necessarily applicable to LMICs. First, the
epidemiological models were calibrated to demographics and health system capacity
data in rich countries, and the model’s predictions on the benefits of imposing social
distancing may change when applied to LMIC settings. Barnett-Howell, Watson, and
Mobarak (2021) formally conducted that exercise and found that the benefits are much
3

Post-lockdown reopening guidelines provided by the WHO were framed around test positivity rates, but
inadequate testing capacity may similarly limit their applicability in LMICs (Shonchoy et al. 2021).
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smaller in LMICs, driven by the large differences in population age structures and health
system capacities across poor and rich countries; for instance, the proportion of elderly
population is six times larger in high-income relative to low-income countries, and
COVID fatality rates an order of magnitude larger for the elderly than for young people.
Second, in rural areas of LMICs with limited health infrastructure -- say, where there are
no ventilators -- “flattening the curve” by delaying infections would not actually prevent
unnecessary deaths because the infection curves in the model remain above the (very
low) health capacity line. Imposing social distancing therefore produces much smaller
gains in terms of deaths averted compared to rich-country settings.4
When one converts the lives saved into a monetary value using the VSL methodology
(as in Greenstone and Nigam (2020) and Barnett-Howell, Watson, and Mobarak
(2021)), there is an even larger gap between the benefits generated in rich versus poor
countries, in part as the VSL is estimated to be much higher in the US or UK than it is in
Nigeria or Bangladesh (Viscusi and Masterman 2017). This is not because some lives
are inherently worth more than others, but because the poor and rich would naturally
choose to make different money versus risk tradeoffs in a pandemic situation. Richer
people can more easily afford to stay at home, in that they are more willing to sacrifice
their livelihoods to avoid the risk of contracting COVID. In contrast, a poor day-wage
laborer in Bangladesh may be less inclined to forgo her economic livelihood if staying

4

Kim and Loayza (2021) and von Carnap et al. (2020) find smaller marginal gains from suppression than
from mitigation measures, and the gains from both mitigation and suppression are again smaller in poor
countries compared to rich nations. Alon et al. (2020) argue in favor of age-specific or sector-specific
policies (e.g., school closures) over blanket lockdowns in LMICs.
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home implies that her children will not have enough to eat that week. This logic
explains both why the pandemic and lockdowns impose larger costs on poorer
populations within countries, and also why VSL is larger in richer countries. When
LMICs with weak social safety nets have to worry about the hunger that emerges due to
social distancing, they would not make that same policy choice as rich countries.
Ma et al. (2021) quantify these effects by augmenting an SIR model with
macroeconomic indicators on the effects of economic downturns on child mortality. They
find that in poor countries lockdowns can lead to 1.76 child deaths per COVID fatality
averted, producing a net increase in mortality. This echoes an early sharply-worded
op-ed warning: “Lockdowns will starve people in low-income countries” (Jamison 2020).
Taken together, these analyses highlight the fact that not only are the benefits of social
distancing smaller in LMICs, the costs imposed on society are arguably far larger due to
weaknesses in health infrastructure and the social safety net. We present empirical
evidence on these adverse consequences in sections 3, 4 and 5.
3. Empirical Overview of Health Patterns during the COVID-19 Pandemic
The virus was first identified in Wuhan, China in late 2019 (hence the “19” in its name).
Starting in early 2020, the virus spread globally and by March there were rising
infections in countries at all income levels (Figure 2) and all major world regions (Figure

5

This is a systemic issue that distinguishes LMICs. Alfaro, Becerra, and Eslava (2020) show that in
economies with larger informal sectors, a greater share of the workforce faces unemployment risk during
lockdowns. For example, 50% of jobs in Colombia were at risk when COVID prevention measures were
instituted but this would drop to 33% if Colombia’s employment distribution looked like that of the US.
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3). These infection case numbers (Panel A in both figures) and deaths (Panel B) are
likely to be underestimates given limited COVID-19 testing capacity (especially early in
the pandemic) and misreporting by some governments, issues we return to.
The time pattern of recorded infections was notably different across country income
levels. Throughout 2020 and early 2021, recorded cases and deaths per capita were
generally higher in high income countries (Figure 2) -- and equivalently in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) group (Figure 3) -than in LMICs, echoing Section 2 above, and suggests that certain aspects of
demography or economic structure may have partially shielded poor countries, at least
early on. These broad patterns are reflected in the experiences of several of the highest
population countries in these regions (Appendix Figure A2).
Yet some of these gaps could also reflect more testing and better reporting in HICs
(Nkengasong 2020). Over 2020, recorded case and death rates in middle income
countries (Figure 2), and in particular in Latin America, Middle East and North Africa,
and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Figure 3) show sharp increases, probably due to
both rising actual case rates and improved reporting (Beschel Jr and Yousef 2020),
although overall rates remained modest into early 2021 in the world’s two poorest
regions, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. The rising rates of excess mortality
documented in some LMIC regions -- and again in Latin America, Middle East and
6

The infection data is collated by Our World in Data (Ritchie et al. 2020), and is from the COVID-19 Data
Repository at Johns Hopkins University (Dong, Du, and Gardner 2020). Immunization data is collated by
Our World in Data from official reports; and excess mortality data is from the Human Mortality Database
Short-term Mortality Fluctuations project (University of California, Berkeley, and Max Planck Institute for
Demographic Research, www.mortality.org) and the World Mortality Dataset (Karlinsky and Kobak 2021).

11

12

North Africa, and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Appendix Figure A3) -- during 2020,
even when official COVID cases and deaths were relatively flat, suggests pervasive
under-reporting.7
Following a spike in new cases and deaths in wealthy countries in late 2020 to early
2021, there was a similar lagged rise in LMICs several months later. By early to mid
2021, recorded cases and deaths per capita were higher in several LMIC regions than
in the OECD (Figure 3), including in Latin America and South Asia. Several of the
world’s largest LMICs, including India and Brazil (see Appendix Figure A2) experienced
sudden surges of cases and deaths, often linked to the rise of new virus variants that
were particularly infectious (including the Delta variant that is spreading rapidly as we
write). These surges overwhelmed health care systems and led to thousands of deaths,
many of which may have gone unrecorded (Anand, Sandefur, and Subramanian 2021).
The 2021 reversal of pandemic fortune across world regions can be attributed to the
rising case rates in all LMIC regions combined with a dramatic decline in COVID-19
cases and deaths in rich countries. The main cause of this drop is the mass deployment
of vaccines (Tregoning et al. 2021), beginning in early 2021 (Figures 2 and 3, Panel C).
By the end of the period covered in the figures (1 August 2021), vaccination rates had
increased dramatically in HICs, including in the US and UK Kingdom (Appendix Figure
A2, Panel C), and stood at several times the vaccination rates in LMICs.

7

Of course, the pandemic could have also contributed to higher mortality for causes other than direct
COVID-19 deaths -- for instance, due to an inability to receive treatment for other health conditions or
deteriorating socio-economic conditions (which we return to below) -- so the rise in excess mortality while
reported COVID-19 deaths were modest does not definitively prove that cases were under-reported.
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In early 2021 (Figure 4, Panel A) and at the time of writing (Panel B), the rates of
COVID-19 vaccination have been consistently highest in the world’s wealthiest
countries -- concentrated in Europe, North America, East Asia and Oceania -- and rates
decline monotonically with per capita income (Figure 2, Panel C). The world’s poorest
region, Sub-Saharan Africa, has by far the lowest vaccination rate at only 1.2%, with
somewhat higher rates in middle income regions (8.7%), although these greatly lag the
OECD’s 41.6% (Figure 3, Panel C). In this matter of literal life and death, wealthy
societies have monopolized access to the new vaccine technology through policy
decisions that fail to support the global COVAX effort to provide vaccines to LMICs,
while simultaneously providing third boosters for their own populations (Mueller and
Robbins 2021).8
Together with many other observers, including public health experts (The Lancet
Infectious Diseases 2021; Hassan, Yamey, and Abbasi 2021; Moon, Alonso Ruiz, and
Vieira 2021; McSweeney and Chingono 2021), we believe this is categorically unjust
and an abdication of ethical and humane leadership on the part of the world’s richest
societies, including the country that we live in (the United States). At the time of writing,
many of the richest countries have large stocks of unused vaccines, as vaccine
hesitancy has slowed mass distribution efforts, while highly vulnerable populations in
LMICs -- including health care workers and the elderly -- remain largely unvaccinated.
The WHO Director Dr. Tedros Ghebreyesus wrote in January 2021: “I need to be blunt:
the world is on the brink of a catastrophic moral failure – and the price of this failure will
8

For detailed data on vaccine procurement by individual countries, blocs (e.g., African Union) and global
agreements such as COVAX, refer to: https://launchandscalefaster.org/covid-19/vaccinepurchases.
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be paid with lives and livelihoods in the world’s poorest countries” (World Health
Organization 2021b). In the next section, we review the empirical evidence on economic
impacts in LMICs.
4. Impacts on Living Standards in Poor Countries
The COVID-19 pandemic has also been an enormous economic shock: global GDP
declined by approximately 4% in 2020, a recession larger than any decline recorded in
the last six decades (Appendix Figure A4, International Monetary Fund 2020b). As a
point of contrast, global GDP declined by roughly 2% during the Great Recession of
2009 and was largely flat during the 1973-4 Oil Crisis. Although comparable national
series are not readily available, it is likely that the COVID-19 pandemic has caused the
largest global decline since the period of the Great Depression and World War II in the
1930s and 1940s (International Monetary Fund 2020a). In absolute numbers, the
pandemic has increased the number of people living in poverty by nearly 100 million
back to 2015 levels, undoing 5 to 6 years of progress (Gerszon Mahler et al. 2021).
We next discuss a growing literature documenting the evolution of economic conditions
in LMICs since March 2020, utilizing household surveys and other data sources to go
beyond the national statistics that form the basis of Figure A4. Aggregate national
accounts data have recognized deficiencies relative to direct surveying for tracking the
well-being of the poor (Deaton 2003a; 2003b). Household surveys are necessary
because aggregate data can overlook large segments of the population: over a quarter
of economic activity and half of all workers in Africa, Asia, and Latin America are in the
14
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informal sector (Medina and Schneider 2020; ILO 2018), and therefore are not fully
captured in most official statistics. Informality similarly undermines the informativeness
of private sector transactions data such as payroll, credit, or smartphone transfers.
Hence, many approaches national statistical agencies and researchers have used to
document COVID economic patterns in HICs cannot easily be implemented in LMICs.9
Egger et al. (2021) is among the first relatively comprehensive analyses of pandemic
living standards in LMICs during 2020. Egger et al. (2021), as well as Bundervoet et al.
(2021) discussed below, rely on original, large-sample household surveys in LMICs.
These research teams adapted existing data collection protocols to deploy phone
surveys, often starting mere weeks after the start of the pandemic. Egger et al (2021)
utilize random sampling to generate statistically representative information about 16
populations in nine countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America -- namely Bangladesh,
Burkina Faso, Colombia, Ghana, Kenya, Nepal, Philippines, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone
-- that have a combined population of nearly 500 million. The 30,000 surveys collected
cover heterogeneous samples constructed in different ways: seven samples rely on

9

Data collection during the pandemic posed a unique set of methodological challenges in LMICs.
Economic data is more regularly reported by government agencies in high-income countries, but such
administrative records are less frequently collected in LMICs and less reliable when large shares of the
economy are in the informal sector. To generate high-frequency signals during the pandemic, Chetty et al.
(2020) creatively assemble granular-level records produced by the data systems of US private companies
to document spending, revenue, employment rates. A similar data infrastructure does not exist in most
LMICs. This is why development economists resorted to phone surveys in LMICs as the primary method
of tracking economic conditions during the pandemic. This can be supplemented with smartphone-based
data on (say) mobility from Google, Facebook and other sources (Buckee et al. 2020; Ilin et al. 2021;
Kraemer et al. 2020), but smartphone penetration is also lower in LMICs, limiting representativeness. The
World Bank and their partners in national statistical offices have filled in important gaps in 2020-21
through large-scale phone survey efforts in scores of countries, creating data public goods that have
contributed to many of the projects that we survey in the remainder of this section and the next.
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random phone digit dialing (RDD) , and skew toward wealthier mobile phone owners,
while nine are drawn from earlier studies representative of specific subsamples,
including formal and informal sector workers, agricultural laborers, small business
enterprises, refugees, migrants, and their families.
While their data is unusually timely, it has important limitations. All post–COVID-19 data
were collected via telephone interviews to comply with social distancing guidelines.
Unfortunately, this places limits on data collection: surveys were short, lasting only
15-30 min with relatively coarse economic measures and rendering some types of
measurement infeasible. Some of the surveys compare income reported during
pre–COVID baseline surveys to a contemporaneous report (in the phone survey) to
determine whether there has been a change in income. Yet others rely on retrospective
reports of baseline income, which carry the risk of respondent recall or reporting biases.
Finally, the data focus on March to July 2020 and thus are valuable for tracking the
initial shock but not the pandemic’s extended effects.
With those caveats in mind, Egger et al (2021) documents the widespread nature of
economic hardships and the decline in living standards: across the 16 samples,
between 8 and 87% of respondents report a drop in income during the crisis period, with
a staggering median of 70% It is important to recognize up front that these “pandemic
effects” are the combined effects of the virus plus the country-specific policy responses,

10

Random digit dialing (RDD) is a type of probability sampling in which the research sample is
determined by randomly generating telephone numbers to call. This creates a study sample frame
representative of those with a phone. Very poor households may not own phones or live in areas with low
connectivity and so may be underrepresented (an issue the authors discuss but we do not focus on here).
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and these factors cannot in general be separately identified. The proportions reporting
declines in employment are similarly high, ranging from 5 to 49% (median share 30%).
The adverse economic shock has been compounded by impediments to livelihood: in
most countries, a large share report reduced access to markets (median share 31%),
likely related to the ubiquitous lockdowns.11 Together, these drops in employment,
income, and access to markets contribute to food insecurity: between 9 and 87% of
respondents were forced to miss or reduce meals (median share 45%). Even in
Colombia -- the richest country in the sample -- large shares of respondents report
drops in income (87%) and employment (49%) and increased food insecurity (59%).
Social support in response to the economic shock has been mixed: the proportion of
respondents who report benefiting from government or NGO crisis support runs the
gamut in the sample from 0 to 49% (median share 11%). However, the high rate of
missed meals and reduced portion sizes suggests that even when these efforts are
present, they have been insufficient. For instance, Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh
report the highest rates of assistance, likely due to preexisting international aid
infrastructure, yet even in this sample 27% of respondents report food insecurity. More
detailed data in one Kenya sample indicate that households also engage in extensive
dissaving, such as selling assets and spending stored cash, to stabilize consumption.12
These adverse economic effects vary substantially both across countries and different
subsamples within countries, but perhaps surprisingly Egger et al (2021) find little

11
12

Ceballos, Kanna, and Kramer (2020) similarly find disruption of agricultural market access in India.
Mahmud and Riley (2021) find dissaving in a Ugandan sample though no large-scale asset liquidation.
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evidence that this variation is systematic by socioeconomic status (SES). The finding
that even relatively well-off households experienced adverse economic shocks in LMICs
indicates that the rich could not easily “buy” their way out of the crisis, and resonates
with academic and journalistic accounts (Dahir 2020a; Singh and Kumar 2021; Cefalà et
al. 2020). There is similarly no clear pattern across refugee and nonrefugee
populations: reported food insecurity is actually slightly lower among refugees than the
host communities living near Rohingya camps in Bangladesh (perhaps due to greater
presence of humanitarian organizations there), yet on the other hand, food insecurity is
somewhat higher among refugees in Kenya compared with a national sample.13
Egger et al (2021) also draw on a subset of samples that feature more detailed panel or
repeated cross-sectional data with richer measures, allowing them to quantify the depth
of economic decline. Firm revenue, a natural measure of overall local economic activity,
was adversely affected: in rural Kenya, average firm profits and revenues fell by 51 and
44%, respectively (both P < 0.05 relative to pre-crisis levels; Figure 5, Panel A1). The
analogous decline in Sierra Leone is a similarly large 50% (P < 0.05; Panel A2). 14 In the
rural Kenya sample, there is also a decline in per capita consumption expenditures
(Panel B1), with declines in nonfood expenditures of 29% (P < 0.05) persisting through
May 2020. Food expenditures in Kenya and Sierra Leone actually rose slightly, by 11%

13

A central methodological concern with Egger et al (2021) and the related studies surveyed below is that
non-pandemic factors could drive the evolution of outcomes over time, for instance, seasonal variation
related to the agricultural cycle. While it is challenging to rule these out, the authors argue that the
consistency in outcomes across multiple samples, with a wide range of seasonal patterns, suggests that
they are largely documenting crisis impacts. Plus in some cases, they directly document that food
insecurity is far higher during the 2020 crisis than in the same season in previous years.
14
Bishi, Grossman, and Startz (2020) find that 91% of traders in Lagos, Nigeria reported zero revenue
during lockdown periods, and that sales rose after re-opening (but did not return to pre-pandemic levels).
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(Panel B1) and 6% (Panel B2), respectively, although in Sierra Leone this appears to
have been driven by higher food prices (19%, P < 0.05 relative to pre-period; Panel C2)
rather than greater quantities consumed. In contrast, Kenyan prices were largely stable
or even fell slightly (Panel C1). These data indicate that households appear to be
cutting back nonfood consumption in an effort to maintain essential food intake.
Examining food insecurity in greater detail, Egger et al (2021) observe rising rates of
missed meals and reduced portions during the crisis in both Kenya (Panel D1) and
Sierra Leone (Panel D2), and for both adults and children (P < 0.05 for all effects). The
sharp rise in child food insecurity is alarming given the potentially large negative effects
of child undernutrition on later life outcomes (Baird et al. 2016; Victora et al. 2008).
A second notable study is Bundervoet et al (2021), which like Egger et al (2021) relies
on phone survey samples conducted in the first months of the pandemic and collects
similar economic outcomes. This allows for comparability with Egger et al (2021) as well
as similar limitations, for instance around the imperfect representativeness of phone
survey samples. A major advantage of this impressive World Bank coordinated effort is
its use of data from a larger set of countries, 34 in total (with a combined population of
1.4 billion people) from Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America, Europe and
Central Asia, and Middle East and Northern Africa, representing the full range of LMICs.
They document extensive job loss, drops in income and rising food insecurity across
this large sample of countries, with magnitudes similar to the median levels in Egger et
al (2021): 36% of respondents stopped working in the early pandemic and over 64% of
19
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households reported decreases in income, while food insecurity rose, and they find
large adverse effects in all major LMIC regions. Bundervoet et al (2021) also present
detailed information on the heterogeneity of impacts across major demographic and
socioeconomic groups. A striking finding is the far higher share of women who lost a job
at the start of the pandemic (42%) compared to men (at 31%), suggesting that the crisis
was highly gendered (which we discuss in the next section). The gradient with respect
to SES is more nuanced: workers in non-agricultural self-employment experience
particularly large drops, while those working in agriculture -- who are often among the
poorest in LMICs -- were somewhat less affected. Similarly, there were large income
drops across the respondent educational distribution. Khamis et al. (2021) extend the
collection of core economic measures and show there was a substantial but still only
partial recovery in income and employment in the latter half of 2020.15
While no other studies (to our knowledge) have the extensive cross-country LMIC
coverage of Egger et al (2021), Bundervoet et al (2021) and Khamis et al (2021), an
emerging literature documents impacts among particular populations; as presented in
Appendix Table A2, these study a wide variety of LMIC cases, and examine outcomes
ranging from food insecurity to firm outcomes and coping strategies (although despite
searching a range of sources, we have almost certainly missed important contributions
in this rapidly evolving literature). Together, they echo the central finding of sudden and
large declines in LMIC economic activity and living standards during the pandemic.

15

Furbush et al. (2021) document a similar time pattern of partial household economic recovery in late
2021 in four Sub-Saharan African countries.
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A few examples illustrate, although we point the reader to the appendix for a fuller
picture. Mahmud and Riley (2021) collect follow-up phone survey data of an existing
sample in rural Uganda during the early months of the pandemic and document adverse
economic consequences, including falling household income and food consumption (by
60% and 50%, respectively), a drawing down of savings and declining life satisfaction.
Le Nestour and Moscovitz (2020) similarly find that 87% of Senegalese households
experienced a drop in income and increased food insecurity in the early pandemic.
Malik et al (2020) find that household income and small business sales fell by roughly
90% in Pakistan and microfinance repayment rates plummeted, and both Hamadani et
al. (2020) and Rahman and Matin (2020) document similar patterns in Bangladesh.
This body of evidence leaves little doubt that the COVID-19 pandemic has had a
massively negative economic impact on households and firms across LMICs since
March 2020. Stepping back, one key limitation of the existing evidence is that it focuses
mainly on the early pandemic period. It will be valuable for new studies to present data
from late 2020 into 2021 (and beyond) for a fuller dynamic picture.16
An important open question is the role that government lockdown policies played in
driving these adverse outcomes. While critical for containing virus spread, more severe
lockdown policies in India have been associated with greater regional declines in GDP,
including when measured using night lights (Beyer, Jain, and Sinha 2020), as well as
reduced income, food insecurity and mental health outcomes among women based on
16

A valuable source for up-to-date LMIC data is the World Bank Household Monitoring Dashboard:
https://www.worldbank.org/en/data/interactive/2020/11/11/covid-19-high-frequency-monitoring-dashboard
which suggests some improvements in socio-economic conditions in 2021 in many countries.
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household surveys (Bau et al. 2021). Yet Meyer et al. (2021) document a large negative
impact on the livelihoods of Ethiopian garment workers in mid-2020 due to changes in
world demand for their products, despite the fact that there were then few COVID-19
cases in the country and that Ethiopia was pursuing mild lockdown policies (Oqubay
2020), evidence of the truly global nature of the economic shock.
5. Broader Impacts for Households and Society
This section outlines effects beyond the incomes and living standards impacts that were
the focus of the previous section, including on (i) education, and both (ii) health access
and (iii) mental health. Some are the direct result of the pandemic and others could be
consequences of the resulting economic shock, as well as the coping mechanisms that
individuals and households took to deal with rapidly declining living conditions. We also
place special focus here on how the pandemic has differentially affected (iv) migrants
and refugees, and (v) women across all of these dimensions. Some common coping
mechanisms that LMIC households adopt to deal with adverse economic shocks have
been shown to be differentially disadvantageous to women and girls, including practices
of early marriage and reliance on transactional sex (Corno, Hildebrandt, and Voena
2020; Corno and Voena 2016; Jones and Gong 2021; Archibong and Annan 2019).
Here we focus on a few studies; for a more thorough (although surely still incomplete)
review, refer to Appendix Table A3. We do not cover many important societal outcomes
for reasons of space and because they fall beyond the scope of this article.17
17

An important area that we miss relates to political outcomes, which may themselves have economic
consequences. Disease outbreaks have affected politics throughout human history -- as documented in
all the ancient religious texts and in debates in the new U.S. republic about the appropriate public health
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5.1 Education
The pandemic led to massive drops in school enrollment during 2020 and into 2021 in
most countries, and this is likely to have a wide range of adverse consequences for
children today, their futures and their societies.18 Across poor and rich countries, most
children had only a few weeks of in-person schooling during the first year of the
pandemic (Evans et al. 2021). For children in many LMICs, a lost year of schooling
could account for a large proportion of their expected lifetime educational attainment.
We again turn to Bundervoet et al (2021): they find that roughly 30% of children were
unable to continue any schooling during the early pandemic. In some countries, like
Kenya, entire school years were cancelled (although the Government of Kenya later
partially reversed this policy (Dahir 2020b; BBC News 2021; Yusuf 2021)). Bundervoet
et al (2021) highlight how these closures are likely to exacerbate social inequalities, as
children of low income families, those who have parents with less education and who
live in rural areas were all more likely to miss school time. Many remote schooling
approaches -- via internet or television, for instance -- are inaccessible for children from
marginalized communities (Mueller and Taj 2020; Akmal et al. 2020; UNESCO 2021).

response to yellow fever (Chernow 2004)-- and the global COVID-19 pandemic is no different. There are
ample journalistic accounts and research studies linking the pandemic to the rise of political instability,
authoritarianism, conflict, and polarization in countries rich and poor (Kishi 2021; Swanson 2020; Blanc
and Brown 2020; Perrigo 2020; Cheeseman 2020; Cheeseman and Smith 2020), and this topic clearly
merits detailed examination in a different venue.
18
The World Bank and UNESCO have detailed global trackers of school closures and education impacts;
see https://www.worldbank.org/en/data/interactive/2020/03/24/world-bank-education-and-covid-19 and
https://en.unesco.org/covid19/educationresponse#durationschoolclosures.
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The initial data indicates that a substantial amount of learning was simply “lost” during
the first year of the pandemic, and it remains unclear whether and how these children
will be able to catch up. For instance, children in Ethiopia only learned 30-40% as much
on average as in a normal school year (Evans et al. 2021; J. Kim et al. 2021), while
math knowledge was documented to decline for many students in Kenya (Whizz
Education Report 2021) and Pakistan (Crawfurd, Hares, and Minardi 2021), and
particularly those from poorer backgrounds. Phone survey data from the Young Lives
project indicate that large shares of adolescents in Ethiopia, India, Peru and Vietnam
either dropped out of school or chose not to enroll, or had minimal engagement with
their teachers if still enrolled (Favara et al. 2021). The pandemic economic shock may
also make it more difficult for poor families to pay for school fees in the coming years. It
seems unlikely that these losses will be fully reversed for those who dropped out due to
the pandemic (Favara et al. 2021; Evans et al. 2021; Dessy et al. 2021).
Azevedo et al (2020) argue that this loss of schooling, learning and ultimately human
capital in most LMICs could have major long-run economic consequences. They
simulate the macroeconomic effects on future economic growth from the loss of
schooling (and associated lower wages) -- building on work like that in Barro (2013),
among others, that estimates how aggregate schooling levels affect country economic
growth -- and find that losses of a 5 month school shut down in 2020 have a global net
present value of US$10 Trillion. Lopez Boo, Behrman, and Vazquez (2020) carry out a
related exercise for lost preschool attendance. These studies are based on a partial
equilibrium assumption, in other words, assessing the impact of education in a given
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society holding constant education in the rest of the world. The COVID-19 pandemic
shock is unusual in that it reduced human capital in many if not most societies at the
same time. Whether this global drop in learning has effects larger or smaller than those
estimated in existing work depends on whether education in one country is a
complement or substitute to education in others; to our knowledge, this remains an
unsettled question but one with important implications for pandemic recovery.
These exercises remain speculative, but there are reasons to think that they may
represent lower bounds on true impacts of school closures, which also halted delivery of
the school-based feeding programs that are a main source of nutrition for hundreds of
millions of poor children (Borkowski et al. 2021; Achalika Ahuja and Devolla 2021) as
well as health programs (e.g., mass deworming) in scores of countries.19 Staying home
from school appears to have contributed to teenage pregnancies and marriage, which
could have detrimental long-run effects for many young women’s future economic
prospects. Beyond school closures, child undernutrition also increased sharply during
the pandemic and this will likely have negative long-run economic consequences
(Osendarp et al. 2021).
5.2 Health Access
The ability to access health care has been severely disrupted in most countries and
especially in LMICs (Krubiner, Keller, and Kaufman 2020; World Health Organization
2021a), due to a combination of supply side and demand side factors. On the demand
19

After the temporary halt of a long-standing national primary school deworming program in Kenya in
2020, the government was able to carry out mass treatment in 2021 (Hagemann 2021).
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side, most immediately, mobility restrictions and lockdowns (and fear of contracting the
virus) have directly hindered many individuals from accessing services. The precipitous
drop in living standards discussed in section 4 above limits households’ ability to
purchase some medical services. Supply side disruptions have also been severe. In
some countries, the concentration of resources to deal with COVID infection spikes has
drawn staffing away from other essential health services, and has led to the loss of
medical staff due to COVID morbidity and mortality (especially before vaccines are
widely distributed to health workers, Gholami et al. 2021; Bandyopadhyay et al. 2020).
The pandemic fiscal shock has also reduced government health spending in many
countries.
The combination of these factors has contributed to delayed or cancelled vaccination
drives for other non-COVID illnesses in most countries (Causey et al. 2021; WHO
2020b), with tens of millions of missed doses, and disruption of medical care for other
infectious diseases (e.g., tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, malaria, etc.) and other health
conditions (Jain and Dupas 2021) in many LMICs. These disruptions are predicted to
lead to substantial increases in the future disease burden (Sherrard-Smith et al. 2020;
Nature editors 2020; McQuaid et al. 2020; Weiss et al. 2021), imposing further human
costs for years after the pandemic ends. Meta-analysis also shows significant pandemic
deterioration in maternal and neonatal health outcomes, as well as increased postnatal
depression, with a disproportionate impact in LMICs (Chmielewska et al. 2021). This
could compound the costs of schooling disruption and child undernutrition noted above.
5.3 Mental Health and Wellbeing
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There have been dramatic increases in anxiety and mental distress in LMICs during the
pandemic related to both fear of the disease and consequences of lockdowns, social
isolation and economic deprivation (Kumar and Kumar 2020; Rajkumar 2020), including
in Bangladesh (Hamadani et al. 2020), Ghana (Boateng et al. 2021), Iran and China
(World Health Organization 2020a), and so on. This global phenomenon appears to
affect poor and rich countries, children and adults (Porter et al. 2021). As with other
dimensions of health, access to mental health services has been severely disrupted
(Kola 2020; “The Impact of COVID-19 on Mental, Neurological and Substance Use
Services” 2020c), which is particularly troubling given low baseline access in LMICs.
The mental health impacts appear to be particularly pronounced for vulnerable
populations, including women. Bau et al (2021) survey Indian women and document
increased sadness, depression and hopelessness, with particularly adverse effects for
women in areas experiencing stricter lockdowns, as well as those with daughters and in
female-headed households (who are often more economically vulnerable).
5.4 Migrants and Refugees
Poor households with migrant members were highly vulnerable during the COVID-19
pandemic because they faced a triple threat: increased exposure to the virus, local
economic exposure to the downturn, and susceptibility to economic contraction in
destination markets. Of particular concern is the threat posed to forcibly displaced
populations, who are disproportionately hosted in LMICs with weakened healthcare
systems and safety nets.
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The International Labour Organisation (International Labor Organization 2020)
estimates tens of millions of migrants were stranded abroad without work during the
pandemic. This is a significant problem for LMICs because 192 of the 272 million people
who live outside their country of birth come from regions classified as ‘less developed’
(UNDESA 2019). This not only puts individual migrant households at risk, but can also
have significant global macroeconomic consequences: direct remittances to LMICs in
2018 reached nearly US$500 billion, triple the flow of official development assistance.
Internal (often rural to urban) migration is even more common in LMICs. Barker et al.
(2020) find that both the public health risks of COVID and subsequent economic fallout
have been particularly damaging to households that engage in labor migration, and
merits special policy focus.
Appropriate policies to deal with the risk of disease spread from migrant mobility are
also not necessarily straightforward. For example, Burlig, Sudarshan, and Schlauch
(2021) shows that moderately lengthy domestic mobility restrictions increase infections
once those restrictions are lifted, relative to either shorter or very long restrictions.
5.5 Gender Differences
As noted above, there is evidence that both economic losses and mental health
problems have been more pronounced for women than men during the pandemic
(Bundervoet et al 2021, Hamadani et al. 2020). In terms of other economic outcomes,
Levine et al. (2021) compare male and female-headed households in Sierra Leone, and
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find that the pandemic exacerbated pre-existing gaps: female-headed households faced
greater food insecurity and were less likely to be informed about COVID-safe behaviors.
Investigators have examined and found evidence for similar gender differences along
other dimensions. Women’s work in many countries is concentrated in the informal
sector and in jobs providing care to others, including health care, and many of these
occupations have been particularly hard hit (Staab 2020). For instance, those working in
domestic service jobs may not have been allowed to work in person at their employer’s
residence during lockdown periods. Moreover, informal sector workers may be excluded
from government assistance, which may be restricted to those who pay into national
social insurance schemes, and the same goes for those who lack national ID cards or
mobile phones, all of which are more likely to be female. Those women working in
health care professions -- many of which are dominated by females20 -- were on the
pandemic front lines and experienced increased infection risk, overwork and burnout.
Care responsibilities extend far beyond work, and many women bore the brunt of
childcare responsibilities during school lockdowns in both poor and rich countries (U.N.
Women 2020; Abuya et al. 2020). This can disrupt their economic activities and
threaten household livelihoods, especially for those women who worked outside the
home pre-pandemic (Cucagna and Romero 2021; Deshpande 2020). Women are also
disproportionately responsible for caregiving for ill household members, including those
suffering from COVID-19 related morbidity, possibly for extended periods (i.e., due to
Long COVID) (U.N. Women 2020; Staab 2020). These care responsibilities often
20

70% of community health workers in Sub-Saharan Africa are female (Staab 2020)
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extend to older adolescent girls, impacting their ability to invest in their own schooling
and other important life choices (Baird et al. 2021; Amin et al. 2020).
School closures have also been cited as a risk factor for one of the most important and
troubling effects of this pandemic, a sharp rise in domestic violence against women and
children (Taub 2020), which has been termed the “shadow pandemic”. To illustrate with
data from LMICs, complaints and reports of intimate partner violence and domestic
violence have increased by +0.47 standard deviations in Indian data (Ravindran and
Shah 2020), 50% of women report an increase in all forms of violence during lockdown
in Bangladesh (Hamadani et al. 2020), and there was a +48% increase in calls to a
distress hotline in Peru from March to July 2020 (Agüero 2021); see also Mahmud and
Riley (2021) and Peterman and O’Donnell (2020).21 Children and adolescents have
experienced increased exposure to intra-household violence as well (UCSD Center on
Gender Equity and Health 2021; Banati, Jones, and Youssef 2020).
There are many possible contributing factors, including: the fact that means of recourse
such as shelters and emergency lines have been curtailed due to infection risk (or
overstretched due to the rise in distress calls or budget cuts); the deterioration of
economic conditions and living standards; changes in living arrangements, including
child presence in the home (rather than at school), and “exposure” effects simply due to
greater proximity to partners during the day. Regardless of the particular mix of
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In contrast, Hoehn-Velasco, Silverio-Murillo, and Balmori de la Miyar (2020) from Mexico show that in
the initial months of lockdown (March to May 2020) alimony lapses, sexual crimes and domestic violence
reports decreased by 20% but all crimes rates were back to pre-pandemic levels by four months in.
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contributing factors in any setting, the rise in domestic violence during the COVID-19
pandemic is a major crisis and may leave physical and emotional scars for many years.
6. Public Policy Responses
As we write in August 2021, the most important country-level policy response to
COVID-19 -- and the only action that can bring this pandemic to an end -- is to ensure
widespread vaccination coverage in the population. We first discuss the challenges
LMICs have faced in procuring sufficient doses of vaccines. In the absence of
widespread vaccine coverage, countries should implement non-pharmaceutical
interventions like mask-wearing and lockdowns to slow the spread of disease, and
develop robust social safety nets for citizens whose livelihoods are threatened by
lockdowns. We discuss those two categories of public policy response in this section.
Appendix Table A4 contains a more comprehensive listing of studies on these topics.
6.1 Vaccination Coverage
Most LMICs currently fall far short of vaccination coverage goals (see Figure 2, Panel
C). As of August 1, 2021, in South Asia, only 2.3% of Pakistanis and 6.1% of Nepalis
are fully vaccinated, in West Africa, only around 1.3% of Ghanians and fewer than 1%
of Nigerians are, and in the Caribbean, 4.1% of Jamaicans and less than 1% of Haitians
are fully vaccinated (Ritchie et al. 2020). The low vaccination coverage in LMICs is
largely due to supply shortages, and immediate policy action needs to focus on
procurement (Ahuja et al. 2021). LMICs are currently dependent on support from either
high income countries (HICs) or from the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX)
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initiative for doses. HICs have chosen to largely focus on the challenges of vaccinating
their own citizens, and support to LMICs has been limited: rich countries are storing
excess doses, and have begun to administer third booster doses to their own vulnerable
citizens, while coverage remains inadequate in LMICs. As noted above, this strategy
facilitates the further mutation of SARS-COV2, and propagation of new variants in
LMICs followed by re-importation to HICs will likely prolong the global pandemic.
A case study of COVID vaccine access in Bangladesh illustrates the challenges many
LMICs currently face to implement efficient campaigns. Bangladesh’s inconsistent
access to vaccines has led to a disorganized campaign, and eight months after the first
batch of vaccine doses arrived in the country, only 2.6% of the population has been fully
vaccinated (Ritchie et al. 2020). Bangladesh was successful in procuring the Covishield
vaccine -- manufactured by the Serum Institute of India (SII) under license from
AstraZeneca -- quite early, and started a nationwide rollout on February 7, 2021. As in
other countries, the government prioritized frontline healthcare professionals and those
over 55 years old. Without an effective promotion campaign, demand was low and
access was extended to those aged 40 and above. SII received advance payment and
agreed to provide 30 million doses by June 2021. However, after the first 5 million doses
were delivered, India halted all vaccine exports -- due to the rapid spread of the Delta
variant there -- and that order remains unmet. Bangladesh has since received smaller
donations of Pfizer and Moderna vaccines, and the Chinese Sinopharm vaccine, but
overall coverage is low and the campaign has not really begun in earnest in rural areas.
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The Bangladesh case also illustrates that even when supply shortages are addressed,
LMICs will have to ensure efficient last-mile delivery of vaccines, lower access costs
and convenience -- especially in remote rural areas -- and conduct campaigns to
address vaccine hesitancy and build confidence in the new technology. Existing
economics literature provides guidance on how to boost immunization rates (Banerjee
et al. 2021). Solís Arce et al. (2021) show that vaccine hesitancy is generally lower in
LMICs than in Russia or the US (though itself variable across sub-Saharan African
countries - Africa CDC 2021), and argue that shipping vaccines to LMICs is sensible
from the perspective of maximizing coverage to build global herd immunity.
However, while these vaccine supply shortages remain, LMICs will need to minimize the
public health and economic damage caused by a continuing epidemic by implementing
the programs recommended by public health experts and economists in pursuit of two
broad categories of goals: (1) use non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) -- like
widespread use of face-masks and proper hygiene practices, dissemination of COVID
safety information and protocols, limits on crowding and religious/social gatherings, and
social distancing policies -- to slow the spread of disease; and (2) provide economic
support to the vulnerable population who are adversely affected by social distancing
and lockdown protocols.
6.2 Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs)
From early in the pandemic, public health experts and the political leadership in each
country were tasked with convincing the general population to follow a new set of
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pandemic protocols including NPIs. Large literatures in the social sciences suggest that
behavior change is difficult to achieve in a single domain, and ensuring population-level
adoption of multiple new practices simultaneously was, unsurprisingly, extremely
challenging. Appropriate policy design is important because this affects adherence, as
revealed through mobility data (Jamison et al. 2020).
Political leaders played a large role by either providing clear guidance to their
constituents and leading by example in some countries, or refusing to do that -- and
jeopardizing public health goals -- in others. For example, several African leaders
quickly enacted aggressive measures to close airports in March 2020 and restrict
mobility to slow the spread of COVID. For instance, Senegal, Rwanda, Mauritius and
Liberia began screening and quarantining travelers at the airport, while Ghana and
Nigeria banned travel between cities and implemented curfews. Within a week of its first
reported case, Kenya shut its schools, banned gatherings, and enforced a mandatory
14-day quarantine for incoming travelers (Mobarak and Mahbub 2020).22
In contrast, the US was relatively slow to react and national policy remained indecisive:
several high-level US government leaders, including former President Trump ignored
basic social distancing and mask guidelines set by their own Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, hosted large political rallies, and even encouraged people to
protest against social distancing (Abutaleb et al. 2020). The Brazilian President
Bolsonaro systematically downplayed COVID-19 risks, blocked any centrally
22

There were also prominent examples of African leaders who were COVID-19 deniers and promoted
destructive public health policies, most famously former Tanzanian President John Magufuli, who passed
away in early 2021, reportedly of COVID-19 related causes (Dahir 2021).
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coordinated response (Anderson 2021, Azjenman et. al 2020), and undermined local
leaders implementing lockdowns or mask mandates. The heterogenous political
responses were at least partly responsible for the highly variable COVID caseloads and
fatalities across countries (Fitzpatrick et al. 2021).
Beyond the macro level reactions from political leaders that can either inspire or deter
collective action, there are many micro-level behavior change strategies, information
campaigns and nudges that can promote adherence to COVID safety protocols, and
many economists have tested innovative interventions to provide relevant guidance to
policymakers. For example, Banerjee et al. (2020) (building on Alatas et al. (2019))
show that light-touch messaging interventions involving celebrities can improve disease
knowledge, and some self-reported health behaviors (e.g. handwashing, adherence to
social distancing) in the short-run. Others including Fitzpatrick et al. (2021), Bahety et
al. (2021), and Allen et al. (2021) have found more limited effects.
6.3 Mask-wearing
Much scientific evidence has accumulated during the pandemic that wearing face
masks can slow the spread of COVID-19 and save lives. As LMICs wait for
vaccinations, masks can act as an important and low-cost line of defense to control the
pandemic. Laboratory studies show that masks block particles emitted by infected
individuals, and randomized trials in hospitals indicate that surgical masks protect
wearers (Howard et al. 2021). Economists have contributed a number of observational
studies to this evidence base, showing that: countries with mask mandates or
mask-wearing norms have had lower infection rates (Abaluck et al. 2020; Leffler et al.
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2020); U.S. states which mandated mask use subsequently experienced declines in
case growth rates (Lyu and Wehby 2020); and model simulations indicate that mask
mandates reduce the growth of cases (Chernozhukov, Kasahara, and Schrimpf 2021).
Despite this growing evidence base on the benefits and cost-effectiveness of masks,
ensuring universal mask-wearing has met with numerous practical, political and even
scientific challenges. Since a substantial share of coronavirus transmission stems from
asymptomatic or presymptomatic individuals, the science would appear to support a
policy of universal mask-wearing rather than mask-wearing among only those with
symptoms. Yet mask-wearing has been politicized in some countries.23 If the decision to
wear a mask signals a political affiliation, then achieving universal mask-wearing
becomes challenging in politically polarized societies. In January 2021, over 40% of the
world’s population lived in countries where mask-wearing was mandated in public
areas, and another 40% in countries where universal mask norms prevailed (Abaluck et
al. 2021). However, the actual ground-truthed data suggests that it has been difficult to
ensure persistent mask-wearing in LMICs. In Bangladesh, proper mask use remained
very low, at around 10-20%, even after the government formally mandated mask use
and threatened to fine those who did not comply (Abaluck and Mobarak 2020). An
August 2020 phone survey in rural Kenya finds that while 88% of respondents claim to
wear masks in public, direct observation in market centers revealed that only 10%
actually did so (Jakubowski et al. 2021).
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For the case of the United States, Bazzi, Fiszbein, and Gebresilasse (2021) attributes some of this
resistance to historical factors, such as a culture of “rugged individualism” in some regions.
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In LMICs with weak capacities to enforce mandates, a more proactive policy approach
appears necessary to ensure consistent usage. Abaluck et al. (2021) show that a
combination of mask promotion strategies involving free distribution, information
dissemination, community leader engagement and reinforcement via mild social
shaming triples mask usage in rural Bangladesh, effects persist for 10 weeks, and this
significantly reduces symptomatic COVID transmission, especially among the elderly.
This program was subsequently adopted by governments and others in Bangladesh,
Pakistan, India, Uruguay, and Nepal to reach over 100 million people (at the time of
writing), a notable example of how economics research can quickly translate into
large-scale policy impact (Innovations for Poverty Action 2021).
6.4 Social Benefit Transfers
While policies regarding lockdowns and mask mandates have been controversial, there
was broader consensus in many countries on the need to ensure a social safety net for
those suffering from the pandemic-related economic shock, and as a result, many
governments implemented new cash assistance programs or scaled up existing ones.
Between March 20th, 2020 and May 14, 2021, a total of 3,333 social protection
measures -- including social assistance, social insurance, and labor market protection
programs -- were planned or implemented in 222 countries or territories, and cash
transfers have been the primary instrument (Gentilini et al. 2020). There is evidence that
cash transfers can mitigate the adverse economic and mental and physical health
consequences of COVID-19 (Banerjee, Faye, et al. 2020; Brooks et al. 2020).
Effectively implementing cash transfer programs requires policymakers to overcome at
37

38

least two key challenges: (1) identifying the individuals or households who most urgently
require assistance, while minimizing inclusion and exclusion errors in targeting; and (2)
transferring funds to targeted beneficiaries safely and efficiently.
Variation in financial infrastructure across countries has proven to be important in the
effectiveness of targeting and delivery of such payments (Berkouwer et al. 2021).
Countries with more advanced digital financial services that allow governments to send
payments directly into mobile or bank accounts can scale up transfers faster (Rutkowski
et al. 2020). However, even Kenya, an African mobile money leader, faced challenges in
implementing a pandemic relief program: Human Rights Watch (2021) “found that only
a small fraction of vulnerable families in Nairobi benefited from the [COVID-19 cash
transfer] program, given cronyism, nepotism and outright favoritism.” The urgency of the
pandemic has created unprecedented opportunities for innovations in this area. For
example, Blumenstock (2020) and Aiken et al. (2021) report on big data and machine
learning techniques that helped the Togolese government target the most vulnerable
households for direct cash payments. The systems developed through these
partnerships could be useful for future assistance programs beyond the pandemic.
Other such “COVID innovations” include the high-frequency phone surveys of
statistically representative samples that have been spearheaded by the World Bank to
improve data collection efficiency during the crisis. Such data could also be useful for
building more robust social protection systems going forward. Innovations like the
Kenya COVID tracker, Sierra Leone COVID dashboard, and data dashboards set up in
38
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Bangladesh (in partnership between the government innovation agency and
researchers) ensure that new data and insights being generated in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic crisis are now quickly reaching the desks of policymakers.
7. Looking Forward
We do not see this section as a conclusion in the traditional sense: we write as the
COVID-19 pandemic continues to rage around the world, spreading and changing by
the day and with no clear endpoint in sight. Rather we hope to highlight some remaining
issues and opportunities, and speculate about how the pandemic’s impacts will radiate
through low- and middle-income countries in the coming years.
A main empirical finding of this piece is that LMICs have been very hard hit health-wise,
economically and socially by the COVID-19 pandemic. The world has experienced the
largest global recession in living memory, and the consequences in low resource
environments with limited government capacity have been particularly dire. Early hopes
that the pandemic would simply pass poor countries by -- due to their younger age
profile or perhaps other factors -- have unfortunately proven premature. A second focal
fact in the literature is that -- as in richer countries -- socially disadvantaged groups,
including women and those who work in-person with their hands (rather than behind a
desk or at a computer), have experienced some of the pandemic’s worst effects.
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See: Kenya COVID Tracker: https://www.kenyacovidtracker.org/; Sierra Leone COVID Dashboard:
https://sl-dashboard.github.io/corona/; Bangladesh Dashboard:
https://dashboard.corona.gov.bd/webportal.
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There are several lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic that are worth keeping in mind,
although it is an open question how well they will apply to the next global crisis. Other
global pandemics may occur in the coming decades, and there are also likely to be
increasingly frequent climate-related shocks, unfortunately. The COVID-19 pandemic
experience indicates that building a more robust social safety net, including the ability
for governments to quickly mobilize public assistance to vulnerable households, will be
essential for an appropriately rapid and scaled up response next time. One small silver
lining of the pandemic is the fact that large-scale social safety net programming has
increased dramatically since early 2020 (Gentilini et al. 2020), and innovative delivery
approaches have been developed and deployed at scale, including sophisticated
targeting methods and low-cost mobile money transfers (Aiken et al. 2021).
At the same time, future crises may be different and this might require learning a whole
new set of lessons or pulling distinct policy levers. For instance, in contrast to
COVID-19, the next virus that leads to a pandemic (should one occur) might be deadlier
for children than it is for adults or the elderly. This would change the public health
calculations and appropriate policy response around which types of institutions should
be shut, the optimal extent of social distancing, and the like. These caveats and
uncertainties apply not only to future pandemics, but even to the likely evolution of this
pandemic in the very near future.
The pandemic has also shone a negative light on the current ability of global institutions
to address humanity’s most important challenges. The coming year will be one in which
the bonds of international solidarity will be tested. The epidemiological consensus is that
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the only way out of the health crisis is to achieve high levels of vaccination globally (The
Lancet Infectious Diseases 2021), and there have been some moves in this direction,
including the COVAX programs and vaccine assistance from China, Russia and others
(Westcott 2021; Gavi 2020). Yet as we showed above, these efforts have not been up to
the challenge and vaccination in the world’s poor countries lags far behind.
Related to the classic economic theory of externalities (Samuelson 1954), everyone
remains vulnerable as long as it remains the case that large shares of the world’s
population remain unvaccinated. The pandemic won’t be over for anybody until it’s over
for everybody. The next variant that emerges in a largely unvaccinated society could be
more infectious and deadlier than the last. There is thus a very strong economic case
for large-scale transfers -- far beyond what we have seen so far -- from the world’s rich
to poor countries to provide the vaccination and other forms of assistance needed in this
critical moment (Sandefur 2021). These are important not just for today but for the
future, given the potentially massive adverse long-run consequences of the COVID-19
pandemic for the next generation in LMICs -- for instance, through lost educational
opportunities, early and unintended pregnancy, and exposure to domestic violence.
Yet leaders in the world’s rich countries have for the most part opted to direct assistance
to poor countries that falls short of the level needed to contain the pandemic. The
obvious explanation is that this is due to a short-run political calculus: it is politically
challenging for leaders to direct resources abroad when there is a public health crisis at
home. Few leaders in wealthy countries have articulated the reality of the global
situation to their citizens, explaining the importance of giving all people access to the
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new life-saving vaccine technology -- given the epidemiological and economic logic laid
out above -- even though doing so is in the best interest of rich country populations.
Thus we draw twin lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic. One is that scientific
evidence and rational policy making, combined with genuine international solidarity and
compassion, are critical ingredients to any successful response. The second is that the
political reality of most rich countries does not allow them to be sufficiently generous to
LMICs, even if this inadequate response ends up hurting the rich countries themselves
by prolonging the crisis, as appears to currently be the case with COVID-19.
What then is a potential solution to this failure? One obvious way forward would be to
establish a more robust system of international taxation, redistribution and policymaking
-- perhaps through a strengthened United Nations system -- to overcome collective
action problems and achieve an adequate degree of funding for global public goods like
pandemic response (as well as for responding to global warming) (Nordhaus 2006). In
the absence of a fairer system of global redistribution, the residents of low- and
middle-income countries -- the vast majority of the world’s people -- remain at the mercy
of the world’s rich, as the COVID-19 virus rages, hoping that vaccine charity reaches
them before it is too late.
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FIGURES AND TABLES:
Figure 1: Government Stringency Index in Response to Covid-19 deaths per
million over time

Sources: Hale et al. 2021.
Notes: This figure shows the relationship between deaths and government responses to contain the
spread of COVID-19 across the selected countries. The level of government response is measured by the
Stringency index constructed by the Oxford Covid-19 Government Response Tracker. It is a composite
measure that is based on nine containment and closure policy measures and their respective severity.
These indicators include school closures, workplace closures, internal and international travel bans, and
stay-at-home orders. The index is then rescaled to be between 0 and 100. If policies vary at the
subnational level, the index considers the level of response of the strictest sub-region.

Figure 2: Cases, deaths, vaccination rates by income group (HIC, LMIC+, LIC)

Sources: Official data collated by Our World in Data (Ritchie et al. 2020; Dong, Du, and Gardner 2020)
downloaded on Aug 1st, 2021.

Figure 3: Cases, deaths, vaccination rates by OECD and other regions (SSA, SA,
EA, MENA, EE, LAC)

Sources: Official data collated by Our World in Data (Ritchie et al. 2020; Dong, Du, and Gardner 2020)
downloaded on Aug 1st, 2021.

Figure 4: Maps of global vaccine coverage by country

Sources: Official data collated by Our World in Data (Ritchie et al. 2020).
Notes: Share of the total population that received at least one vaccine dose. This may not equal the share
that are fully vaccinated if the vaccine requires two doses. This data is only available for countries which
report the breakdown of doses administered by first and second doses.

Figure 5: Annual Global GDP growth 1961-2020 (in %)

Notes: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency.
Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of
the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for
depletion and degradation of natural resources. Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD
National Accounts data files.

Figure 6: Key Economic Indicators Over Time

Notes: This figure is replicated from Figure 1 of Egger et al. (2021). It shows the percentage difference
from baseline for several indicators in rural Kenya and Sierra Leone during the COVID-19 global
pandemic relative to the pre–COVID-19 or early COVID-19 levels. The Kenya sample is representative of
all households and enterprises across 653 rural villages in three sub-counties taking part in an
unconditional cash transfer program. The Sierra Leone sample is representative of households in 195
rural towns across all 12 districts of Sierra Leone. Surveys in Kenya were conducted in two rounds.
During the first round (weeks 1 through 8), 8594 households were interviewed. During the second round

(week 11), 1394 households were surveyed, of which 1123 were interviewed for a second time. Surveys
in Sierra Leone were conducted across 2439 households. The pre–COVID-19 levels are from questions
that recall data from February (A1) and March (A2 to C2) or from a previous survey conducted in
November 2019 (D2). The post–COVID-19 levels are from questions that recall data from the prior 7 days
(A to D2 and C to D1), prior 2 weeks (A1), and a combination (prior 7 days for food and prior 2 weeks for
nonfood expenditures in B1). The weeks on the horizontal axis refer to the start of the recall period for
each observation rather than the period during which the data were collected. The dotted lines in A1 and
A2 show the linear trend from the pre-COVID baseline to the first observation for each respective time
series. Baseline level for D1 is 1.3 days out of seven for adults and 0.72 for children. Baseline level for D2
is 35% of adults missing any meals in prior 7 days and 25% of children. *P < 0.05.

Figure 7: Evolution in number of countries/territories and social protection
measures

Sources: Figure 1 (“Evolution in number of countries/territories and social protection measures”) in
Gentilini et al. (2020).

APPENDIX MATERIAL:
Figure A1: Stay-at-home orders by country over time

Notes: Categories are split by geographic scope. 'T' are targeted measures and 'G' are national-level
measures. 'With exceptions' includes daily exercise, grocery shopping, and essential trips. 'Minimal
exceptions' mean only once a week or only one person can leave at a time. This data comes from the
Oxford Covid-19 Government Response Tracker.

Figure A2: Cases, deaths, vaccination rates for selected countries

Sources: Official data collated by Our World in Data (Ritchie et al. 2020; Dong, Du, and Gardner 2020)
downloaded on Aug 1st, 2021.

Figure A3: Excess deaths by region

Sources: Our World in Data (Ritchie et al. 2020) based on mortality data from the Human Mortality
Database (HMD) Short-term Mortality Fluctuations project and the World Mortality Dataset (WMD),
downloaded on Aug 1st, 2021.
Notes: Excess mortality is defined as the percentage difference between the number of weekly or monthly
deaths in 2020–2021 and the average number of deaths in the same period over the years 2015–2019
(though for a small minority of countries only data from 2016 or 2017 to 2019 are available).
Excess mortality contains missing data for many countries. In particular, there is no available information
for any of the countries in the South Asia group. The countries included in the averages pictured for the
other regions are given below in parentheses: OECD (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States),
Sub-Saharan Africa (Mauritius, and Seychelles), Middle East and North Africa (Egypt, Lebanon, Oman,
Qatar, Tunisia), Latin America (Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay), East Asia and Pacific (Hong Kong, Macao, Mongolia,
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand) and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Albania, Andorra,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Georgia, Gibraltar,
Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Liechtenstein, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, North
Macedonia, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan).

Appendix Table A1: Conceptual Issues for Analyzing the Economics of COVID-19
Panel A: COVID-19 Response Policies for Low and Middle Income Countries
Study

Countries/Regional Scope

Sample/Methodology

Summary*

Susceptible-Exposed-InfectedRecovered (SEIR) model
adjusting for country-specific
healthcare capacity (number of
hospital beds per 1,000)

Mitigation strategies show significant economic gains, but
marginal gains decrease when moving from mitigation to
suppression. Lower income countries gain less in moving
from no intervention to mitigation and still less in moving
from mitigation to suppression than higher-income
countries do.

Susceptible-Exposed-InfectedRecovered (SEIR) model

Social distancing policies deliver less value in lower-income
countries that have younger populations. Trade-offs are
more pronounced for poorer people who are less able to
make economic sacrifices.

The Intergenerational Mortality
3. Tradeoff of COVID-19 Lockdown 85 countries
Policies (Ma et al, 2020)

SIR macro model augmented
with different ages and elasticity
of child mortality to aggregate
income

Lockdown-triggered reduction in labor supply and
consumption, meant to lower COVID-19 mortality, can be
counterproductive in LMICs, as economic contractions
increase overall child mortality.

A Novel Index-Based Decision
Support Toolkit for Safe
Reopening Following a
4.
Generalized Lockdown in Low
and Middle-Income Countries
(Shonchoy et al, 2021)

24 countries

Susceptible-InfectedRecovered-Mortality (SIRM)

Re-opening strategies differ between HIC and LMIC.

Colombia, USA

Modelling framework to quantify
job and income losses from
accounting identities and data
for US and Colombia, depending
on different economic
organizational structures

Characteristics of jobs (informality, sectoral distribution,
lack of labor protections) in LMICs increases risk of labor
income and job losses as a result of lockdowns, and social
distancing policies. Workers are exposed to demand
shocks and have limited ability to telework.

Economic Loss from COVID-19
Fatalities Across Countries: A
202 countries classified by income
1.
VSL Approach (Kim and Loayza, group
2021)

2.

The Benefits and Costs of Social
178 countries, aggregated by income
Distancing in High- and Lowclassification
Income Countries (BarnettHowell et al, 2020)

EMEs and COVID-19 (Alfaro et
5.
al, 2020)

6.

The Macroeconomics of
Pandemics in Developing
Uganda
Countries: An Application to
Uganda (von Carnap et al, 2020)

How Should Policy Responses
to the COVID-19 Pandemic
7.
Differ in the Developing World?
(Alon et al., 2020)

N/A

Extension of SusceptibleInfected-Recovered (SIR) model
to incorporate economic
Optimal containment is less restrictive in Uganda than in
decision-making (working and
the US because of differences in demography,
consuming exposes agents to
comorbidfities, and health systems, lower income.
contagion risk, and so when
infection levels rise, they reduce
economic activity)
Susceptible-Infected-CriticalRecovered (SICR) model
incorporating contact matrices
measuring the number of
contacts between individuals of
different ages in different
locations, calibrating for the US
and for a representative
developing economy

Blanket lockdowns are less effective in developing
countries, saving fewer lives per unit of lost GDP. Agespecific policies are more effective since they focus scarve
public funds on childing those who are most at risk. School
closures are more effective at saving lives in developing
countries.

Panel B: COVID-Response Policies for High Income Countries
Study

Countries/Regional Scope

The Effect of Large-Scale AntiChina, South Korea, Italy, Iran,
Contagion Policies on the
1.
COVID-19 Pandemics (Hsiang et France, and the USA
al., 2020)

Sample/Methodology

Summary*

Reduced-form econometric
methods

Anti-contagion policies prevented or delayed on the order of
61 million confirmed cases, corresponding to averting
approximately 495 million total infections.

Does Social Distancing Matter?
(Greenstone and Nigam, 2020)

UK, USA

Individual-based Simulation
Model and Value of Statistical
Life (VSL)

Impact of Non-Pharmaceutical
Interventions (NPIs) to Reduce
3. COVID-19 Mortality and
Healthcare Demand (Ferguson
et al., 2020)

UK, USA

Microsimulation Modelling

Optimal Targeted Lockdowns in
4. a Multi-Group SIR Model
(Acemoglu et al., 2020)

N/A

Multi-group SIR model

2.

*Summary may directly reference authors' own words in abstract and paper.

Moderate social distancing is projected to reduce fatalities
by 1.76 million which would produce economic benefits
worth $7.9 trillion.
Suppression will minimally require a combination of social
distancing of the entire population, home isolation of cases
and household quarantine of their family members. May
need to be supplemented by school and university
closures. Will need to be maintained until a vaccine
becomes available since they predict that transmission will
rebound if interventions are relaxed.
Optimal policies differentially targeting risk/age groups
significantly outperform optimal uniform policies and most
of the gains can be realized by having stricter lockdown
policies on the oldest group.

Appendix Table A2: Impacts on Living Standards in Poor Countries
Panel A: Multi-Country Studies
Study

1.

2.

3.

Falling Living Standards During the
COVID-19 Crisis: Quantitative
Evidence from Nine Developing
Countries (Egger et al., 2021)

Countries/Regional Scope

Bangladesh, Nepal, Philippines,
Burkino Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Sierra
Leone, Rwanda, Colombia.

The Short Term Impacts of COVID19 on Households in Developing
Countries: Overview Based on a
Harmonized Dataset of HighFrequency Surveys (Bundervoet et
al, 2021)

Burkina Faso, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Djibouti, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Gabon,
Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Croatia,
Indonesia, Kenya, Cambodia, Lao
PDR, Madagascar, Mexico, Myanmar,
Mongolia, Malawi, Nigeria, Peru,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,
Romania, El Salvador, South Sudan,
Uganda, Uzbekistan, VIetnam, Zambia.

The Early Labor Market Impacts of
Covid-19 in Developing Countries:
Evidence from High-Frequency
Phone Surveys (Khamis, 2021A,
Follow-Up Khamis, 2021B)

Burkina Faso, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Djibouti,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala,
Honduras, Croatia, Indonesia, Kenya,
Cambodia, Lao PDR, Madagascar,
Mexico, Myanmar, Mongolia, Malawi,
Nigeria, Peru, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Romania, El Salvador,
Solomon Islands, South Sudan,
Tajikistan, Tunisia, Uganda,
Uzbekistan, VIetnam, Zambia,
Zimbabwe.

Sample/Methodology

Themes

Summary

Phone surveys of samples drawn
via RDD and from pre-existing
studies. The total sample consists
of rural and urban households,
formal and informal sector
workers, agricultural laborers,
small business enterprises,
refugees, and migrants. (~30,000
respondents)

Income

Steep declines in income: Median share of 70% of
respondents across samples reported a drop in income.

Employment
Access to
Markets
Food Security

Income
Phone surveys of samples drawn
via RDD and from pre-existing
Employment
nationally representative surveys.
The total sample consists of rural
and urban households, and formal
and informal sector workers. (~46,
Food Security
000 respondents)

Income
Phone surveys of samples drawn
via RDD and from pre-existing
nationally representative surveys.
The total sample consists of rural
and urban households, and formal
Employment
and informal sector workers.

Income

4.

Socioeconomic Impacts of Covid-19
in Low-Income Countries
Ethiopia, Malawi, Nigeria, and Uganda
(Josephson Et Al., 2021; Follow-Up
Furbush Et Al., 2021)

Phone surveys of a sample drawn
from a pre-existing nationally
representative samples as part of
the LSMS-ISA survey (10,865
households).
Food security

5.

Young lives, interrupted: Short-term
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic
on adolescents in low- and middle
income countries (Favara et al.,
2021)

India, Ethiopia, Peru, and Vietnam

Income
Phone surveys of a sample from a
pre-existing survey called the
Young Lives Survey (YLS). The
Employment
total sample consists of young
people from two cohorts aged 19
and 25. (~10,000 respondents)
Food Security

Income

6.

7.

Did COVID-19 Market Disruptions
Disrupt Food Security? Evidence
from Households in Rural Liberia
And Malawi (Aggarwal et al, 2020)

Liberia, Malawi

Unmasking the Impact of COVID-19
on Businesses: Firm Level Evidence
Global (~51 countries)
from Across the World (Apedo-Amah
et al, 2021)

Phone surveys of a sample drawn Food Prices
from a pre-existing study. The
sample consists of rural
households and market vendors.
Access to
(~1,200 households and ~2,100
Markets
market vendors)

Decline in employment: Median share of 30% of respondents
across samples who lost their jobs at the time of interview.
Reduced access to markets: Median share of 31% of
respondents across samples faced difficulty purchasing food
because of mobility restrictions.
Steep decline in food consumption: Median share of 45% of
respondents across samples either skipped meals or reduced
portion size or quality.
Steep declines in income: 64% of households reported a
decrease in total income.
Decline in employment: 35.6% of respondents stopped
working, either temporarilty or permanently.
Higher for those economically affected: 8 percentage points
more likely to miss a meal if the respondent has lost their job,
and 8 percentage points higher for households who
experienced a drop in income.
Steep decline with modest recovery: Between April and July
2020, an average of 20% of employees experienced income
loss. This share declined by around 25 percentage points
since the early phase of the crisis but remain high.
Large decline with substantial recovery: Between April and
July 2020, an averageof 34% of workers stopped working.
Between the second and third quarters of 2020, the average
employment rate increased by 10 percentage points. There is
little evidence of a continues large recovery in employment
between the third and final quarters of 2020, with only a 2
percentage point increase during the last two quarters of the
year. The share of employment in the commerce sector
increased by 0.8 percentage points and 1.2 percentage points
in mining, manufacturing, public utilities and construction
Large reduction in income with a modest recovery over time:
In the months immediately following COVID-19 restrictions
77% of the population reported a loss in monthly income.
Since those times, fewer households have reported a loss of
income since the previous month of the survey. Non-farm
enterprise revenue saw a steep decline in the first few months
in all four countries, but have made a modest recovery
relative to the month previous.
High food insecurity with modest decline over time: In the
early months, food insecurity was high in Malawi and Nigeria
where the prevalence was more than 60% of the adult
population. For Uganda and Ethiopia food insecurity was
relatively lower at 40%. However, the prevalence of food
insecurity declined across all four countries over time.
Large reduction in income: Between 60-94% of households in
the four countries experienced a fall in income or a rise in
expenses
Higher employment: In the four countries, between 13 and 33
percent of adolescents who were not working before the
pandemic were working.
Higher food insecurity: In three of the four countries, around
13-16% of respondents reported that their household had run
out of food since the pandemic began at least once. In
Vietnam, this was around 4%.
Large decline in income- 42-52% reduced monthly profit
among food vendors.
Mixed depending on agricultural season: Increase of 4-9% for
all food items and 12-20% for staples in Liberia. Large
declines in prices of food in Malawi likely due to the harvest
coinciding with lockdown
Severe disruption in market access: 98% of food vendors
reported that they are closed or reduced business hours in
Liberia, and 25% in Malawi.

Food Security

No effects on worsened food security across the two countries
from market disruptions.

Income

Decreases in sales: Globally, the pandemic has had a
persistent negative impact on sales.

Employment

Reduction in hours: Globally, the employment adjustment has
mostly been a reduction in hours and increased leave of
absenses. A smaller share of firms laied off their workers.

Phone surveys of businesses
(100,000 businesses)

Panel B: Single Country Studies
Study

Countries/Regional Scope

Sample/Methodology

Themes

Summary

Income

Drop in income: Income shocks led to a decline in income
across groups. Vulnerable non-poop and non-poor categories
suffered a drop of 67% and 65% respectively.

1.

Livelihoods, Coping, and Support
During Covid-19 Crisis (Rahman and Bangladesh
Matin, 2020)

Phone surveys of urban slum
dwellers and rural poor drawn from Food security
census data and a narionallyrepresentative survey

2.

Immediate Impact of Stay-at-Home
Orders to Control Covid-19
Transmission on Socioeconomic
Conditions, Food Insecurity, Mental
Bangladesh
Health, and Intimate Partner
Violence in Bangladeshi Women and
Their Families: An Interrupted Time
Series (Hamadani et al, 2020)

Phone surveys of a sample drawn
from a pre-existing study. The total Employment
sample consists of mothers of
children enrolled in an iron
supplementation program. (2,424
mothers)
Food Security

Lower food expenditure: Expenditures for food are lower but
much smaller than the corresponding drop in income.
Higher use of savings and borrowing: 67% of urban
respondents and 83% of rural respondents relied on savings.
However more urban slum dwellers relied on borrowing to
meet needs. Very few respondents sold assets to meet there
Savings and Debt needs.
Family income fell: Median monthly family income fell from US
$212 to $59 during lockdown. Proportion of familities earning
Income
less than $1.90 per day rose by 47.1 percentage points.

Income

3.

Food Consumption and Food
Security During the COVID-19
Ethiopia
Pandemic in Addis Ababa (Hirvonen
et al., 2021)

Phone surveys of a sample drawn
from a pre-existing study. The total
Employment
sample consists of urban
households. (~600 respondents)
Food Security

4.

The Market-Reach of Pandemics:
Evidence from Female Workers in
Ethiopia’s Ready-Made Garment
Industry (Meyer et al, 2021)

Ethiopia (Hawassa Industrial Park)

5.

Short-term impacts of COVID-19 on
food security and nutrition in rural
Guatemala: Phone-based farm
household survey evidence
(Ceballos et al, 2020)

Guatemala

6.

India (Haryana and Odisha)

Phone surveys of a sample drawn Access to
from a pre-existing study. The total Markets
sample consists of rural
agricultural households. (1,515
farmers)
Food security

Income

7.

Jordan

Phone surveys of a sample drawn
using RDD. The total sample
consists of refugees, and low and Employment
high wage workers (4,000
respondents)
Access to
Markets
Food security

8.

The Short-Term Economic Effects of
COVID-19 on Low-Income
Households in Rural Kenya: An
Kenya
Analysis Using Weekly Financial
Household Data (Janssens et al.,
2020)

Reduction in income: In the May, June, and July surveys, over
50% of respondents states their household incomes are lower
or much lower than usual. Poorer households are more likley
to report income losses than richer households.
Reduced employment: Job losses were high, but mostly
voluntary where the employee terminated their contract.
No change in food security: Food consumption and household
dietary diversity were at the same levels, or even slightly
higher by August 2020 compared to the same time the
previous year.

Large drop in employment: 41% of respondents employed in
January 2020 were put on leave or terminated by April to July
2020. 91% of those not currently working do not have other
employment, although 41% of them have tried to find a job or
start a business. The majority of respondents no longer
working have relocated to a rural area (43% of those on paid
leave) - important coping mechanisms as those who left
report lower levels of food insecurity and a lower percentage
of them report any food expenditures at all
Large reduction in income: About 80% of households report a
decrease in income. Almost two- thirds of households
reported a fall in income from both agricultural-related and
non-agricultural-related activities. For non-agricultural
Income
activities, more people report a large decrease. Households
receive significantly less remittances-- 94% report a decrease
in the amount received and a 97% decrease in frequency .
Higher difficulty accessing markets: 78% of sampled
Phone surveys of a sample drawn
communities were closed or had restricted access. 90% of
from a pre-existing study. The total Market access
households indicate a decrease in food availability, and the
sample consists of rural
majority of households report an increase in prices across all
agricultural households. (1,428
food groups.
households)
High food insecurity: 91% of households report having eating
less than they thought they should. 20% report having not
eaten despite feeling hungry. Dietary diversity also
Food security
decreased, mainly driven by reduuced diversity in animal
proteins. Dietary diversity for children increased.
High share of dissaving and selling assets: About one-third
Savings and Debt use savings to cope with the crisis. 30% report selling assets.
Borrowing from friends and family dropped.

Savings and Debt

Economic Impacts of COVID-19
Lockdowns: An Examination of
Recoveries in Jordan (Cefalà et al.,
2020)

Moderate to severe food insecurity: The number of familities
experiencing any level of food insecurity increased by 51.7%

Phone surveys of a sample drawn
from an electronic personnel
dataset of RMG production
Employment
workers and applicants. The
sample consists of female RMG
workers. (3,896 workers)

Income
Impacts of a National Lockdown on
Smallholder Farmers' Income and
Food Security: Empirical Evidence
from Two States in India (Ceballos
et al., 2020)

Reduction in work: 96% of mothers reported a reduction in
paid work for the family

Phone surveys of a sample drawn Income
from a pre-existing study. The total
sample consists of low-income
rural households with either a
Food security
woman who is pregnant or a
mother of a child below 4 years
old. (328 respondents)

Costs and prices changed: 41% of farmers in Haryana
reported having spend more on harvest than usual, including
higher labor and machinery costs. In Odisha, 36% of farmers
reported selling at prices lower than usual.
More difficulty accessing markets: 61-74% of farmers could
not sell their harvest immediately upon harvest, and had to
store it to sell or consume in the future.
Difficulty accessing food: In the period after the lockdown 25%
of farmers in Haryana reported that they had difficulty
accessing different kinds of food due to unavailability in the
market or increased prices.
Higher debt: In one state, 14% of farmers were more likely to
take out a loan to finance the shortfall in agricultural income
Large decline in earnings: Wage earnings decreased by 42%
of pre-pandemic baseline levels on average during
lockdowns. After lockdowns eased, earnings still remained
19% below their baseline. Low wage workers saw a larger
decline in earnings compared to high wage service workers.
Decrease in employment: Unemployment of adult population
increased from 7% to 16% during lockdown. Highly educated
and high wage service workers saw relatively larger
reductions in hours worked during lockdown.
Decline in access to markets: About hald of workers faced
some dfifficulty buying food suring lockdown.
Decline in food consumption: 10% of working respondents
skipped meals or reducted portions.
Sharp drop in income: Household income decreased by up to
a third in the five weeks after the first lockdown was
implemented. In particular income drop work, as well as gifts
and remittances received decreased sharply.
No change in food consumption: Food expenditures were
stable over the 5 week period.

8.

The Short-Term Economic Effects of
COVID-19 on Low-Income
Households in Rural Kenya: An
Kenya
Analysis Using Weekly Financial
Household Data (Janssens et al.,
2020)

9.

How COVID-19 Has Affected Lagos
Traders: Findings from HighFrequency Phone Surveys (Bishi et
al, 2020)

Nigeria

10.

Impacts of COVID-19 on Food
Security: Panel Data Evidence from
Nigeria (Amare et al., 2020)

Nigeria

Phone surveys of a sample drawn
from a pre-existing study. The total
sample consists of low-income
rural households with either a
woman who is pregnant or a
Deposited less and loaned less: Households withdrew less
mother of a child below 4 years
money from accounts, and deposited less savings. Credit and
old. (328 respondents)
Savings and Debt
loan supply dropped, as well as loan repayments, gifts, and
Harambee contributions.
Phone surveys of a sample drawn
from a sample of a pre-existing
Severe drop in revenue: 91% of traders reported zero
Business
survey. The sample consists of
revenue during lockdown measures. Sales rose substantially
Revenue
wholesale and retail traders in
after re-opening but did not return to pre-pandemic levels.
Lagos, Nigeria. (765 respondents)
Reduced employment: Participation in non-farm business
activities reduced by 11 percentage points. There is a smaller
Phone surveys of a sample drawn Employment
impact on wage-related activities and farming activities.
from a pre-existing nationally
representative survey. (1,950
Significant increase in food insecurity: lockdowns increased
households)
households' experience with food insecurity by 13 percentage
Food Security
points.

11.

COVID-19 and the Future of
Microfinance: Evidence and Insights Pakistan
from Pakistan (Malik et al., 2020)

Phone surveys of a sample drawn Income
from a general population of
microfinance borrowers with
outstanding loans, and a
population of 'graduated'
borrowers. The sample consisted
of microenterprise owners and
Savings and Debt
microfinance loan officers. (1,000
microenterprise owners, 200 loan
officers)

12.

Phone Survey on the COVID Crisis
in Senegal (Le Nestour et al., 2020)

Phone surveys of a sample drawn
via RDD. (1,023 respondents)

Senegal

13.

Age, Employment and Labour Force
Participation Outcomes in COVIDSouth Africa
era South Africa (Espi et al, 2021)

14.

Household Response to an Extreme
Shock: Evidence on the Immediate
Impact of the COVID-19 Lockdown
Uganda
on Economic Outcomes and WellBeing in Rural Uganda (Mahmud
and Riley, 2021)

Phone surveys with a sample of
households drawn from a preexisting nationally representative
survey (5,862 respondents)

Huge decline in income: Week-on-week business sales and
household income fell 88-91% after the lockdown. Informal
sector workers were particilarly hit hard.

Severe drop in repayment rates: 70% of regular borrowers
reported that they could not meet the required payment on
their microfinance loans.

Income

Large decline in income: 86.8% of respondents reported a
loss of income. This is more pronounced in rural areas and
among people living below the povert line.

Food Security

Less meals: Over a third of respondents report limiting the
size of their meals four to seven days a week.

Employment

High churn over time: The employment-to-population ratio in
March 2021 is nearly identical to how it was in February
20202, before lockdown policies. However, there has been a
lot of churn between these two time periods with 23% of those
employed in February 2020 are employed a year later, and
30% of those without employment finding employment by
March 2021. The youth experienced the largest recovery in
eployment-to-population ratio between February 2020 and
March 2021 compared to older adults. The industries that
experienced the highest recovery were community, social and
personal services, and wholesale and retail trade.

Income

Large decline in household income: 60% on household nonfarm income both enterprise and labor.

Phone surveys of a sample drawn Food Security
from a pre-existing study. The
sample consists of rural
Savings and Debt
households. (1,277 households)

Large decrease in food expenditure: 40% reduction per adult
equivalent
Households use up nearly 50% of their savings and borrow
more

Labor Supply

Increase total household labor supply to enterprises and labor
outside of the household.

Summary

Panel C: Data and measurement methods during COVID-19
Countries/Regional Scope

Sample/Methodology

Themes

1.

The Short-Term Impacts of COVID19 on Households in Developing
Countries (Bundervoet et al, 2021)

34 countries

Representative samples from
phone surveys in 34 countries

Use of high-frequency phone surveys in 34 countries to study
Phone/household
economic and social effects of pandemic, by focusing on
surveys
inequities within LMICs

2.

Rapid Food and Income Security
Assessment: How Are BRAC
International Volunteers and
Programme
Participants Coping with COVID-19
(BRAC report, 2020)

Afghanistan, Myanmar, Nepal,
Tanzania, Liberia, Sierra Leone,
Uganda and the Philippines

BRAC phone surveys with BRAC
volunteers and participants (1019
respondents)

Phone surveys within BRAC structure to understand effects of
Phone/household COVID virus among most vulnerable: focusing on rapid
response to changes in income and food security, and current
surveys
and future coping mechanisms

3.

Falling Living Standards During the
COVID-19 Crisis: Quantitative
Evidence from Nine Developing
Countries (Egger et al, 2021)

Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Colombia,
Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Nepal,
Philippines and Sierra Leone

4.

Household Response to an Extreme
Uganda
Shock (Mahmud and Riley, 2020)

Random digit dialing + random
samples from pre-existing studies:
to create representative random
samples
Representative random sample
from in-person surveys prepandemic (1217 rural households)

Move towards phone survey for real-time tracking of the
Phone/household economic effects of the pandemic in 9 countries, due to lack
surveys
of frequency with household surveys and increased precision
not found in aggregate data
Use of phone surveys to follow up on in-person survey to
Phone/household
study well-being and economic effects of the lockdown for
surveys
rural households

Study

5.

6.

Public Mobility Data Enables
COVID-19 Forecasting and
Management at Local and Global
Scales (Illin et al, 2021)
European Mobile Operators Share
Data for Coronavirus Fight (Reuters,
March 2020)

China, France, Italy, South Korea, and
N/A
the United States (local and regional
data); 80 other countries (national data)
EU countries

N/A

N/A

N/A

7.

Aggregated Mobility Data Could
Help Fight COVID-19 (Buckee et al,
2020)

8.

How Did COVID-19 and Stabilization
USA
Policies Affect Spending and
Employment? (Chetty et al, 2020)

N/A

9.

Precision for COVID - Vulnerability
Index (SurgoVentures)

African Countries

N/A

10.

COVID-19 is a Developing Country
Pandemic (Gill and Schellekens,
2021)

LMICs

N/A

Publicly available mobility data (FB, Google, Baidu)
Tech companies measuring adherence to NPIs are integrated in an
and mobility data epidemiological model to forecast COVID-19 cases and help
assist public officials
European mobile carriers are sharing data with EU politicians
Tech companies
to monitor people's movements and compliance with national
and mobility data
and local lockdowns, prompting concerns on privacy
Population-level (aggregated) mobility data could be used in
order to refine COVID response policies, especially
Tech companies
interventions and messaging meant to encourage social
and mobility data
distancing, as it provides real-time information about
movement patterns at a granular level.
Use of private sector data to analyze effect of COVID and of
US COVID policy response (PPP, stimulus checks, etc.) on
spending and employment for low-wage and high-wage
workers in the US
Combining large-scale surveys (DHS, etc.) and other sources
Mismeasurement (published papers, etc.) in order to establish more granular
data - at the subnational level - and and look at the social,
of real effect of
health, and economic effects of COVID within different African
pandemic
countries
Private sector
data

Using excess mortality data (compared to official statsitics),
Mismeasurement
analysis finds that LMICs might have been more affected than
of real effect of
HIC countries - due to comorbidities and higher infection
pandemic
prevalence

11.

Three New Estimates of India's All
Cause Excess Mortality During the
COVID-19 Pandemic (Anand et al,
2021)

India

* Summary may directly reference authors' own words in abstract and paper.

N/A

Contrasting official statistics to other sources (local admin
Mismeasurement data, IFR (infection fatality rate) and household surveys) finds
3.5 to 5m extra deaths from the pandemic in India,
of real effect of
highlighting the underestimation of the true effect of pandemic
pandemic
in LMICs

Appendix Table A3: Broader Impacts for Households and Society
Panel A: Education
Study

Countries/Regional Scope

Sample/Methodology

Summary*

1.

COVID-19: Missing More Than a
Classroom. The Impact of School
Closures on Children’s Nutrition
(Borkowski et al, 2021)

Global

UNICEF report

School closures have led to the collapse of school feeding programs. These programs
have played a large role in supporting childhood nutrition (providing up to 15% of daily
family income), and catching up early growth failures. The 39bn in-school meals missed
worldwide as a result of the pandemic will have dire consequences on children's health,
cognitive development, education (test scores) and earnings potential in the long run. The
economic crisis triggered by the pandemic will also worsen childhood food insecurity with
adverse effects on nutritional outcomes (increase in stunting, wasting, morbidity, especially
in SSA and South Asia due to malnutrition but also in obesity due to reduced physical
activity).

2.

Simulating the Potential Impacts of
COVID-19 School Closures on
Schooling and Learning Outcomes:
A Set of Global Estimates (Azevedo
et al, 2020)

Global

Simulations considering 3, 5,
and 7 months of school
closures

COVID-19 could result in a loss of between 0.3 and 0.9 years of schooling. Close to 7
million students from primary up to secondary education could drop out due to the income
shock of the pandemic alone. Students from the current cohort could, on average, face a
reduction of $355, $872, or $1,408 in yearly earnings.

3.

It’s Been a Year Since Schools
Started to Close Due to COVID-19
(Evans et al, 2021)

LMICs

Evidence from phone
surveys, UNESCO's global
monitoring of school closures
and CGD's COVID Education
Policy Tracker

4.

Economic Costs of Preprimary
Program Reductions due to COVID140 countries
19 Pandemic (Lopez Boo et al,
2020)

5.

6.

7.

The Short Term Impacts of COVID19 on Households in Developing
Countries: Overview Based on a
Harmonized Data Set of Highfrequency Surveys (Bundervoet et
al, 2021)

Burkina Faso, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Djibouti, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Gabon,
Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Croatia,
Indonesia, Kenya, Cambodia, Lao
PDR, Madagascar, Mexico, Myanmar,
Mongolia, Malawi, Nigeria, Peru,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,
Romania, El Salvador, South Sudan,
Uganda, Uzbekistan, VIetnam, Zambia.

Across SSA, MENA, EAP and LAC, children have missed 57%, 75%, 46% and 78% of
their schooling in 2020 respectively. In some of the poorest countries in Eastern and
Central Africa, that amounts to nearly 10-16% of their lifetime expected education. School
closures have also meant that students, especially marginalized ones, have experienced
lower levels of learning, even with access to distance education; many students are at risk
of permanently dropping out, leading to potentially long-term adverse consequences in
terms of human capital accumulation and earnings.
Simulations considering
COVID-19 could result in large losses for children currently in preschools due to cuts in
different per-child program
program participation in pre primary. For a median 6-month cut in participation, losses are
cost depending on income
highest for upper middle income countries (3.38% of GDP), similar for high-income (2.94%
groups and 3, 6 or 12 months f GDP) and lower-middle income countries (2.66% of GDP) and smaller for low-income
of preprimary school closures countries (0.89% of GDP) highlighting large aggregate losses in terms of lifetime earnings.

Phone surveys drawn via
RDD and pre-existing
nationally representative
surveys. The total sample
consists of rural and urban
households, and formal and
informal sector workers. (~46,
000 respondents)

Qualitative interviews with
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, DRC, Kenya,
students, parents, teachers
Madagascar, Morocco, Nigeria, South
and education officials (57
Africa and Zambia
remote interviews)
Phone survey to participants
of a longitudinal cohort study
Young Lives, Interrupted: Short‑term
of a geographically diverse,
Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic
Ethiopia, India (Andhra Pradesh and
poverty-focused sample, also
on Adolescents in Low- and Middle
Telangana), Peru and Vietnam
reaching those without mobile
Income Countries (Favara et al,
phones or internet access
2021)
(8988 individuals)
Impact of COVID-19 on Children’s
Education in Africa (HRW report,
2020)

Ethiopia, Malawi, Nigeria, and Uganda

Phone surveys of a sample
drawn from a pre-existing
nationally representative
samples as part of the LSMSISA survey (10,865
households).

9.

Remote-learning, Time-Use, and
Mental Health of Ecuadorian HighSchool Students during the COVID19 Quarantine (Asanov et al, 2020)

Ecuador

Phone Surveys with a random
sample from pre-existing
sample of high-school
students (1552 students)

10.

Learning Inequalities Widen
Following COVID-19 School
Closures in Ethiopia (RISE
Programme)

Ethiopia

11.

Measuring the Impact of COVID-19
on Learning in Rural Kenya (Whizz
Education Report, 2021)

Kenya

8.

Socioeconomic Impacts of COVID19 in Low-Income Countries
(Josephson et al, 2021)

12.

COVID-19 and Children’s School
Resilience: Evidence from Nigeria
(Dessy et al 2021)

Nigeria

Over 30% of children were unable to continue learning activities during school closures.
Disruptions were higher for children in low-income countries, and within countries they
were higher for children in lower-income households with lower-educated parents in rural
areas.

Lockdown has meant that many children especially vulnerable have received no education
at all; even for those attending remote schooling, interactions with teachers or instructions
have been scarce in some contexts. Children also report learning less (fewer topics or less
content) through remote schooling.
All countries experienced disruptions in education. In Peru, 16% of those engaged in
formal education before the pandemic had dropped out or did not enrol again. In Vietnam,
8% dropped out, and in Ethiopia and India the rate is lower. Those in India and Ethiopia,
only 40% and 10% of students engage in learning activities with their teachers respectively
(both in-person or virtual classes).

Following school closures, the incidence of school-aged children who were previously
attending school engaging in any learning activity fell to an estimated 46%. Studentteacher contact dropped from 96% during pre-COVID times to 17% among households
with school-aged children.

Between 59 and 74% of students have access to a computer/tablet and/or internet at
home, and a vast majority (59% and 92% resp.) have access to the radio and the
television, with some variation with SES levels. Disadvantaged groups with reduced or no
access to internet are less likely to participate in telelearning, and spending less time on
average on schooling.
There is also some difference in engagement with online schooling , with less wealthy
students and younger students spending less time studying compared to richer students,
spending more time on work or leisure (boys), on household tasks (girls).
COVID has exacerbated schooling inequalities, leading to a widening learning gap
between rural and urban students as a result of school closures. The gap is even larger
Sample from Young Lives
Survey, and retesting of some conditional on pre-primary participation, showing that rural children or poorest children
without pre-primary education are left behind. However, the gender gap has remained the
students (~2645 students)
same and not been affected by school closures.
Between March 2020 and late 2020/early 2021, as a result of school closures, rural
students experienced significant learning loss (53% of students saw a decline in their
Sample of students in rural
Maths Age, already behind by 3-4 years compared to international peers). The average
Kenya, who participated in
NGO project (Project iMlango) loss is 1.1 years. The remaining students (47%) saw a small gain in their math learning, by
and had a reliable Maths Age 0.68 years, which is comparable to the annual rates of learning, suggesting that even
students who were least affected by COVID were barely able to catch up to their baseline
in March 2020, reassessed
between October and March levels of learning (prior to any tutoring intervention by the NGO). There is some
2021 (~965 students from 88 heterogeneity: with lower grade students, female students or students from 'hardship'
(rural schools facing more difficult conditions) and rural schools exhibited higher learning
schools)
loss.
Phone surveys with schoolage individuals (aged 5 to 18)
from subsample of
households from the Nigeria
COVID-19 national
longitudinal monthly phone
survey, also interviewed in
person in 2019, and
interviewed before school
closures and after school
reopening (4006 individuals)

Lockdown measures reduce school attendance by 7pp, for children age 5 to 19 and the
effect increases with age (5pp for children 5 to 11; 9pp for children 12-18 and 11pp for
children 15 to 18, past the age of compulsory schooling): suggesting long term effects of
lockdown on schooling outcomes and labor market outcomes.
No difference in gender on the effect of lockdowns on school attendance, except when
interacting gender and geopolitical zone, showing disproportionate effects on girls'
attendance, aged 12-18, in the North West, where education attainment is the poorest for
girls. Suggestive evidence that lockdown measures can increase risk of child marriage in
areas where child marriage is prevalent.

13.

New Data on Learning Loss in
Pakistan (Crawfurd et al, 2021)

Pakistan

Phone surveys with a sample
of households whose children
are enrolled into a large
private school network (~1528
households)

14.

COVID-19 in Pakistan: A Phone
Survey to Assess Education,
Economic, and Health-Related
Outcomes (Akmal et al, 2020)

Pakistan

Phone surveys with a sample
of households whose children
are enrolled into a large
private school network (~1211
households)

15.

What Happened to Senegalese
Students after the COVID-19 School Senegal
Closure? (Mbaye et al, 2021)

16.

The Impact of COVID-19 in
Education: Synthesis Report (Spaull South Africa
et al, 2021)

Increase in time spent studying between June and September 2020 (coinciding with 1st
peak), with slighly larger increase for girls than boys who spent more time working outside
the home.
Math assessment suggests lost learning (fewer correct answers) for boys only, with a 10pp
drop in the percentage of boys who can correctly substract or divide, compared to
expected levels of learning from grade to grade prior to the pandemic. Learning losses are
even more pronounced among poorest children.
Data reveals limited engagement with distance learning: teleschool program launched by
the govt is mostl followed by richer families (86% more likely).
Upon school reopening, 86% of children re-enrolled, with lower re-enrollment rates for
girls.
As of June 2020, 66% of households are not using technology for learning - even among
households with access to TV and mobile, with richer households much more likely
(+55%) to engage in distance learning via technology.
2/3 of households report helping children at home, with strong differences by SES (more
educated and wealthier families being more likely to do so). Limited differences in studying
time between income groups, but some differences based on gender, with girls more likely
to engage in household chores and boys more likely to work outside the home.

By May 2021, most students were back in school: there was no increase in dropout rates
compared to 2018 but +81% increase in grade retention due to the months of closure.
Poorer students were more likely to be held back a grade, with financial consequences on
Face-to-face surveys with
households and students (984 families, whereas as a result of fear of worse performance from their children, richer
households and 182 schools) families were more likely to invest in tutoring (+1.3pp) and private education (+3.2pp at the
secondary level and +1.4pp at the primary level). Poorest students were financially
affected by the closures, as 60% of them declared one household had to stop working
because of them, compared to 37 percent.
500,000 children have dropped out of school during the pandemic. This has tripled from
Phone surveys with a sample 230,000 pre-pandemic to approximately 750,000 as of May 2021. The highest rates were
found amongst the poorest households, those in rural areas, and those with high caregiver
of households drawn from a
worry about learners returning to school. Average school attendance for 7-17 year olds
pre-existing nationally
representative survey (5,862 have dropped 4 percentage points from pre-pandemic times. Results from projects
indicate that between March 2020 and June 2021, most primary school learners in South
respondents)
Africa have lost nearly a full year of learning relative to the 2019 cohort.

Panel B: Health Access
Study

Countries/Regional Scope

Sample/Methodology

Global

Modelling combined with
administrative and reports
from immunization systems,
mobility data

Summary*

1.

Estimating Global and Regional
Disruptions to Routine Childhood
Vaccine Coverage during the
COVID-19 Pandemic in 2020: A
Modelling Study (Causey et al,
2021)

2.

The Impact of the COVID-19
Pandemic on Maternal and Perinatal
Global
Health: A Scoping Review (Kotlar et
al, 2020)

Scoping review of 95
publications

3.

COVID-19 and Healthcare Workers:
A Systematic Review and MetaGlobal
analysis (Gholami et al, 2021)

Meta-analysis of 28 studies
(119,883 patients)

4.

Infection and Mortality of Healthcare
Workers Worldwide from COVID-19:
Global
A Systematic Review
(Bandyopadhyay et al, 2020)

Systematic review including
594 records

Healthcare workers as of early May 2020 represented 4% of the number of patients with
COVID-19, and 0.5% of the COVID-19 deaths worldwide. Women (72% of healthcare
worker infections) and nurses (39%) were more likely to get infected, whereas doctors
(51%) were the largest group who died from COVID-19.

5.

Lives and Livelihoods: Estimates of
the Global Mortality and Poverty
Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic
(Decerf et al, 2020)

Estimation of welfare costs
using pre-pandemic and
COVID age-specific mortality
data, income distribution and
poverty distribution datasets
and GDP growth estimates

Effects of the pandemic and pandemic policies has led to massive welfare costs: based on
growth estimates for 2020, the pandemic could cause 68m additional poverty years (years
of life spent in poverty), and 4.3m yers of life lost. The substantial costs of the pandemic in
terms of poverty are concentrated in poorer countries.

150 countries

6.

The COVID-19 Crisis Will
Exacerbate Maternal and Child
Undernutrition and Child Mortality in 118 countries (LMICs)
Low- and Middle-Income Countries
(Osendarp et al, 2021)

7.

Pulse Survey on Continuity of
Essential Health Services during the
COVID-19 Pandemic: Interim
105 countries (LMIC and non-LMIC)
Report, 27 August 2020 (World
Health Organization, 2020)

8.

Indirect Effects of the COVID-19
Pandemic on Malaria Intervention
Coverage, Morbidity, and Mortality in
African Countries
Africa:
A Geospatial Modelling Analysis
(Weiss et al., 2021)

9.

10.

The Potential Public Health
Consequences of COVID-19 on
Malaria in Africa (Sherrard-Smith et
al, 2020)
Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic
on Maternal and Perinatal
Outcomes: A Systematic Review
and Meta-analysis (Chmielewska et
al, 2021)

Modelling (the MIRAGRODEP
computable general
equilibrium model, Lives
Saved Tool (LiST) and
Optima Nutrition model)
based on different scenarios
of predicted declines in GNI
during 2020-2022

Compared to expected dose delivery, there was lower (estimated) vaccine coverage in
2020 for DPT and measles vaccines, leading to 30m and 27m children missing doses of
vaccines for DPT and measles respectively between Jan to December 2020. This
corresponds to about 9m children not being routinely vaccinated for each of these
diseases, across the whole world, with most missed doses in April, and in the most severe
impact in MENA, South Asia and Latin America.
Some evidence that pregnant people are at higher risk of adverse outcomes when infected
with COVID-19. Also, more likely to suffer more from the non-medical impacts of COVID19: deteriorated mental health, lower access to antenatal care (with potentially worse birth
outcomes in LMICs); disruption of health services affecting delivery and early infant health
outcomes; etc.
Half (51.7%) of health care workers tested positive for COVID-19, with higher share of
hospitalizations (15.1%) and a total mortality of 1.5%, highlighting the high infection risk by
COVID-19 for healthcare workers in the first 6 months of the pandemic.

Accounting for elasticity of wasting to national income, as well as the additional effect of
service disruptions to the health sector on nutritional outcomes, the moderate scenario (in
terms of GNI declines) estimates an increase of 9.3m in the number of children under 5
with wasting (with 2/3th of them in South Asia); an increase of 2.6m children with stunting
in 2022 (most of them will be in SSA) as well as increased child mortality as a result of
child wasting and declines in nutritional intervention coverage.
Additional child stunting and mortality suggest substantial future productivity losses of
$29.7bn dollars under the moderate scenario, these represent 0.2% of current GNI in the
sample countries. Similar, increases in cases of anemia during pregnancy would incur
$79m dollars in productivity losses between 2020-2022.
Disruptions in essential services are geographically widespread across the globe. Almost
every country (90%) experienced a disruption to some extent, with greater disruptions
being reported in low- and middle-income than in high-income countries.

Key-informant surveys of 105
Ministry of Health Officials
The most frequently disrupted services included routine immunization services – outreach
services (70%) and facility-based services (61%) – noncommunicable disease diagnosis
and treatment (69%), family planning and contraception (68%), treatment for mental health
disorders (61%), antenatal care (56%) and cancer diagnosis and treatment (55%).

Mathematical model of
COVID-19 and malaria

COVID-19-related disruption to malaria control in Africa could almost double malaria
mortality in 2020, and potentially lead to even greater increases in subsequent years.

Sub-Saharan African Countries

Mathematical model of
COVID-19 and malaria

If activities are halted, the malaria burden in 2020 could be more than double that of 2019.
In Nigeria alone, reducing case management for 6 months and delaying long-lasting
insecticidal nets campaigns could result in 81,000 (44,000–119,000) additional deaths

17 countries (LMIC: Brazil, Botswana,
China, India, Mexico, Nepal, Turkey
and non-LMIC)

Meta-analysis

Significant increase in stillbirths and maternal deaths during versus before the pandemic; a
higher incidence of post-natal depression during versus before the pandemic; and an
increase in surgically managed ectopic pregnancies.

Phone surveys drawn via
RDD and from pre-existing
studies. The total sample
consists of rural and urban
households, formal and
*Healthseeking behavior module only
Across the 5 African countries: between 11-20% of the respondents (6% in Sierra Leone)
informal sector workers,
collected in these countries but study
report a delayed or reduced access to healthcare, whereas 44% of the sample reports the
agricultural laborers, small
covers 9 countries (Bangladesh, Nepal,
same situation in Colombia.
business enterprises,
Philippines, Burkina Faso, Ghana,
refugees, and migrants. (~30,
Kenya, Sierra Leone, Rwanda,
000 respondents)
Colombia)
Burkina Faso, Colombia, Ghana,
Kenya, Rwanda, Sierra Leone*

11.

Falling Living Standards During the
COVID-19 Crisis: Quantitative
Evidence from Nine Developing
Countries (Egger et al., 2021)

12.

The Potential Impact of COVID-19related Disruption on Tuberculosis
Burden (McQuaid et al 2020)

13.

Intersecting Vulnerabilities: The
Impacts of COVID‑19
on the Psycho‑emotional Lives of
Young People in Low and
Middle‑Income Countries (Banati,
Jones and Youssef, 2020)

14.

The Effects of India's COVID-19
Lockdown on Critical non-COVID
Health Care & Outcomes (Jain &
Dupas 2021)

China, India, South Africa

Mathematical model of
tuberculosis with an agespecific contact matrix
calibrated to data from the 3
countries

Models find that COVID-19 restrictions could lead to an increase of over 20,000
tuberculosis deaths.

Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Lebanon

Qualitative phone and inperson interviews of
adolescents sampled from
pre-existing panel study
(Rural/Urban; refugee camps;
with disabilities; married; in
education/out-of-education)
(568 adolescents)

Concerns about infection were a major deterrent to health-seeking behaviour, especially
for sexual and reproductive healthcare (Cote d'Ivoire/Ethiopia). In Ethiopia, married girls
not seeking antenatal care opting for home births with potentially adverse birth events and
mortality increases

India (Rajasthan)

2.110 patients taken from
3.183 dialysis patients under
insurance: disproprotionately
male (69%), 46 yrs old on
average, under dialsysis
under insurance for 11.5
months, 5 visits/month
Of the 1392 patients alive at
the time fo the first survey,
1177 completed a follow-on
survey

62% of households report disruption of dialysis care during lockdown; 42% report being
unable to reach the hospital due to travel barriers. Effects on care-seeking were worse for
lower caste, poorer patients and those living far away from a dialysis hospital.
Mortality in May 2020 is 4.37%, a 1.7pp increase (63% increase) relative to the 2.67%
mortality in March 2020, pre-lockdown; mortality declines in June & July but never to
March levels - excess mortality appears driven by lockdown related disruptions to care.

Panel C: Mental Health and Wellbeing

1.

Study

Countries/Regional Scope

Sample/Methodology

COVID-19 and Mental Health: A
Review of the Existing Literature
(Rajkumar, 2020)

Summary*

Global

The COVID-19 outbreak seems to have worsened psychological health. Across all studies,
the pandemic and its response have led to the emergence of symptoms of anxiety,
Narrative review of 28 articles depression, and self-reported stress. Sleep also seems to have worsened. This mental
health impact of the pandemic seems to be especially pronounced among vulnerable
populations (health care workers, migrant workers, pregnant women, etc.)
Rates of mild anxiety and mild depression were higher in Peru (32% and 41% resp.) and
Ethiopia (18% and 15% resp.), mirroring higher COVID-19 mortality rates in these
countries, and lowest in Vietnam. In all countries except Ethiopia, women had higher rates
of anxiety and depression than men. Across all countries, there was no consistent pattern
in differential rates of mental health distress by urban/rural, or wealth tercile, or internet
access. Further analysis shows positive association between (at least) mild anxiety and
perception of risk with respect to being infected with COVID-19, leaving the house at least
1 day a week (only in India), economic adversity (even among those who did not have to
reduce food consumption), increasing the odds of mild anxiety.
Increased domestic responsibilites, in India, Peru and Vietnam, as well as changes in
employment status substantially increased odds of anxiety, in Ethiopia.

Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic
on Anxiety and Depression
Symptoms of Young People in the
Ethiopia, India (Andhra Pradesh and
Global South: Evidence from a Four- Telangana), Peru and Vietnam
Country Cohort Study (Porter et al,
2021)

Phone survey to participants
of a longitudinal cohort study
of a geographically diverse,
poverty-focused sample, also
reaching those without mobile
phones or internet access
(8988 individuals)

3.

COVID-19-related Knowledge,
Attitudes, and Practices Among
Adolescent Girls in Bangladesh
(Amin et al, 2020)

Phone Surveys; Sample from
pre-existing survey in UNFPA
districts and random sample
(480 girls) from existing
program targeting 2200
75% of the sample of adolescent girls reports feeling sometimes or mostly depressed
adolescent girls at risk of child
during the lockdown period.
marriage in 5 high child
marriage districts (Bogura,
Jamalpur, Sherpur, Kushtia
and Chapainawabganj) (960
girls)

4.

Immediate Impact of Stay-At-Home
Orders to Control COVID-19
Transmission on Socioeconomic
Conditions, Food Insecurity, Mental
Bangladesh
Health, and Intimate Partner
Violence in Bangladeshi Women and
their Families: An Interrupted Time
Series (Hamadani et al, 2020)

5.

Remote-learning, Time-Use, and
Mental Health of Ecuadorian HighSchool Students during the COVID19 Quarantine (Asanov et al, 2020)

Ecuador

6.

The Market-Reach of Pandemics:
Evidence from Female Workers in
Ethiopia’s Ready-Made Garment
Industry (Meyer et al, 2021)

Ethiopia

7.

Prevalence and Changes in
Boredom, Anxiety and Well-being
Among Ghanaians During the
COVID-19 Pandemic: A Populationbased Study (Boateng et al, 2021)

8.

Pre-existing surveys with
sample drawn from nationally
Women's Well-Being During a
India (Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, representative voter rolls, and
CHW registers of lactating
Pandemic and its Containment (Bau Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, and
mothers and rural households
et al, 2021)
Maharastra)
(1545 households, incl. 573
women for the female survey)

2.

Bangladesh

Ghana

Phone Surveys; Random
sample of mothers of children
enrolled in previously enrolled
in an iron supplementation
RCT (2,424 mothers)

Phone Surveys with a random
sample from pre-existing
sample of high-school
students (1552 students)
Phone surveys (random digit
dialing) of a random sample
from existing electronic
personnel dataset sample of
female Hawassa Industrial
Park workers (3896
respondents)
Web-based survey restricted
to adults 18 and above and
resident in Ghana recruited
on social media (811
participants)

Deterioration of mothers' mental health symptoms: increase of reports during lockdown of
symptoms of depression compared to period before lockdown; anxiety during lockdown
was high, with 25.7% of respondents reported a score consistent with mild anxiety and
12.2% moderate anxiety. 68.8% report change in anxiety symptoms with lockdown
(increase of anxiety for 98.9% of those who reported a change).
There is some suggestive evidence that depression rates have increased as a result of the
pandemic (no baseline score collected), with higher depression levels reported by female
and indigenous students. Closure of schools and isolation are two main problems; 16%
have mental health scores that indicate depression.

24% of respondents screen positive as depression of the depression scale, although there
are no signficant differences by employment status.

Despite limited spread of the infection at the time of the survey, participants were
concerned about the spread of COVID. As a result of the pandemic, the proportion of
people with better well-being (based on mental well-being scale) dropped from 64% to
39%, while the likelihood of reporting boredom symptoms increased from 30% to 43%.
Analysis shows a significant increase in bordeom scores, in generalized anxiety disorders
and a decrease in well-being, compared to the period before the pandemic (self-reported).
Lockdown policies worsen women's mental health: moving from 0 to average containment
policies leads to a 13-14pp (+39-40%) increase in the likelihood that feelings of depression
have worsened and a 20pp (+73%) increase in the likelihood that feelings of tiredness
have increased, with effects increasing in magnitude with the level of containment. Similar
effects from containment are found for anxiety (+13pp or +45%), feelings of safety (nonsignificant decrease).

9.

Impact of the Lockdown on the
Indian Village Economy (Cefala et al India (Tamil Nadu, primarily Chennai)
2020)

10.

The COVID-19 Pandemic, Hunger,
and Depressed Mood Among South
Africans (Hunt et al., 2021)

11.

Household Response to an Extreme
Shock: Evidence on the Immediate
Impact of the COVID-19 Lockdown
Uganda
on Economic Outcomes and Wellbeing in Rural Uganda (Mahmud
and Riley, 2021)

South Africa

Male Migrant daily-wage
laborers working in
construction recruited in
Chennai but mostly from
villages & towns in Tamil
Nadu and their wives
Phone surveys with a sample
of households drawn from a
pre-existing nationally
representative survey (5,862
respondents)

45% of male participants reported feeling very scared or terrified about this situation. Drop
in mental health status for both men (4 pp) and women (2.9 pp). Stigma with travel - 63%
believe that migrants would be treated as ill by people around them if they traveled back to
their native villages.

The risk of screening positive for depression increased from 24% to 29% in mid-end of
2020. This is an increase compared to pre-pandemic risk of depression screening, which
was 21%. The risk persists at 29% through to May 2021.

Phone survey of randomly
Decrease in respondent well-being: high prevalence of mild to moderate depression (53%
selected representative
of respondents) at follow-up (just before lockdown began - early to mid March) and lower
sample of rural households in
satisfaction with quality of life (-1 point), with a decrease of 25% during the lockdown.
Uganda (1075 households)

Panel D: Migrants and Refugees
Study

Countries/Regional Scope

Sample/Methodology

Summary*

1.

COVID-19 Crisis Through a
Migration Lens (World Bank, 2020)

Global

N/A

Migrant workers are more vulnerable to job and income loss, and unemployment risks;
less able to move across sectors. Internal migrants' limited access to basic services and
social safety nets make them more vulnerable to infection and economic crisis under
lockdown restrictions as their movements can seed infections and they cannot migrate to
smooth consumption.

2.

COVID-19 and the Displaced
(Refugees International, 2020)

Global

N/A

Living conditions of refugees/internally displaced people(density, limited access to basic
services esp. intensive care and to reliable info; disruption to humanitarian chains and lack
of attention from broader world) makes them even more vulnerable to the spread of the
disease.

3.

Falling Living Standards During the
COVID-19 Crisis: Quantitative
Evidence from Nine Developing
Countries (Egger et al., 2021)

Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Colombia,
Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Nepal,
Philippines and Sierra Leone

4.

Migration and the Labour Market
Impacts of COVID-19 (Barker et al.,
2020)

Bangladesh, Nepal

5.

6.

The Impact of Domestic Travel Bans
Indonesia, Philippines, South Africa,
on COVID-19 is Nonlinear in Their
Kenya and China
Duration (Burlig et al, 2021)
Prevalence of COVID-19 Symptoms,
Risk Factors, and Health Behaviors
in Host and Refugee Communities in Bangladesh
Cox’s Bazar (Lopez-Pena et al,
2020)

Phone surveys of samples
drawn via RDD and from preexisting studies. The total
sample consists of rural and
urban households, formal and
informal sector workers,
agricultural laborers, small
business enterprises,
refugees, and migrants. (~30,
000 respondents)
Phone surveys of
representative samples of
migrant and non-migrant
households linked to prior
studies.
Susceptible-ExposedInfected-Recovered (SEIR)
model
Phone survey drawn from a
household panel
representative of Rohingya
refugees and host population
(909 households)

No evidence of differential impacts of the pandemic among refugees and non-refugee
populations in Bangladesh and in Kenya.

Migrant households report 25% greater declines in earnings and fourfold greater
prevalence of food security since March. This is attributed to lower migration rates, less
remittances, isolation in origin communities, and greater health risks.
Moderately lengthy domestic mobility restrictions substantially increase infections once
restrictions are lifted (but do not if restriction is short or very long).
The higher prevalence of COVID symptoms among refugees is likely due to worse living
conditions at baseline, but refugees seem more likely to attend social and religious
gatherings (less adherence to social distancing). Controlling for baseline characteristics,
households with return migrants are also more likely to be report COVID symptoms.

India (Bihar and Jharkhand)

Phone survey with 2,259
youth from Bihar & Jharkhand
in June & Jul 2020; all
trainees of a previous 3-6
residential skills training
program

45% of the interstate migrants returned ot their home state and 44% of intrastate migrants
returned home after the COVID-19 lockdown in India. 32% of respondents with a salaried
job in the pre-lockdown period had lost their job. Of those who were in employment, only
31% had received support from employers, mainly through food supplies. 51% of interstate
migrants received government assistance (financial aid, & food supplies) and 31% did not
receive support from any source. Average anxiety levels were higher than in pre-lockdown
(44 vs. 37 on a scale of 100). Willingness to re-migrate was susbtantially lower among
former female migrants (34% vs. 68% for men).

Study

Countries/Regional Scope

Sample

Summary*

Pandemics and Violence against
Women and Children (Peterman et
al, 2020)

Global

N/A

A network of pathways (such as quarantine, social isolation or economic security) links
pandemics to increased domestic violence for women and children. This requires a
gender-sensitive pandemic response due to gendered consequences of the pandemic.

Women and Men in the Informal
Economy (ILO report, 2018)

LMICs

ILO surveys

In low and lower-middle countries, women are more likely to be informal workers. Women
in LMICs are also more often engaged in vulnerable informal work, as family or domestic
workers, where they have a lower labor income and are exposed to "higher decent work
deficits".

LMICs

UN Women surveys

LMICs

N/A

LMICs

N/A

School closures along with health and economic crises can make girls less likely to return
to school long-term, and more likely to engage in negative coping strategies to counteract
loss of HH income (early marriages, transactional sex, etc.) or suffer from disruption of
health services (early pregnancy).

N/A

6.

Child Marriage: the Unspoken
Consequence of COVID-19 (Effoum LMICs
and Revacarren, 2020)

School closures put girls at an increased risk for child marriage and an overall increase in
gender-based violence.

N/A

N/A

Quarantine is effective in controlling spread of COVID but might increase risk of IPV
towards women by fostering isolation and limiting access to support.

7.

COVID-19: Reducing the Risk of
Infection Might Increase the Risk of
Intimate Partner Violence (van
Gelder et al, 2020)

Whose Time to Care? (UN Women,
2020)

Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan,
Bangladesh, Belarus, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chile, Cote
d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Georgia,
Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan,
Lebanon, Libya, Kazakhstan, Kenya,
Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Mexico,
Republic of Moldova, Morocco, Nepal,
North Macedonia, Palestine, Pakistan,
Philippines, Senegal, Serbia, Thailand,
Tunisia, Turkey, Samoa, Uzbekistan,
Vietnam, Yemen, Croatia.

Web-based and Phone
surveys; sampling strategies
and sample size vary by
country

Both men and women report increased domestic responsibilities: an increase in time spent
on chores (60% of women and 54% of men) and an increase in the intensity of unpaid
domestic work (i.e. performing at least tree domestic activities) (28% of women, and 16%
of men). Men and women report spending more time on unpaid care work in similar
proportions (51% and 56% respectively) - in particular, spending more time assisting
elderly, sick or disabled adults (21% and 20%). However, women's care burden has
increased even more, as 33% report increasing time spent on at least 3 care activities,
compared to 26% of men.

7.

COVID-19 Lockdown and Migrant
Workers: Survey of Vocational
Trainees from Bihar and Jharkhand
(Chakravorty et al. 2020)

Panel E: Gender Differences

1.

2.
3.

4.

COVID-19: What Does This Mean
for Gender (IGC, 2020)
COVID-19 Sends the Care
Economic Deeper into Crisis Mode
(Staab, 2020)
COVID-19 and Girls' Education
(Mendez-Acosta and Evans, 2020)

5.

8.

Due to women's occupations in more informal and low-paid sectors (food service for
example), they might bear a disproportionate impact of the economic crisis.
Women are more likely to be in client-facing sectors (they form the majority of health care
workers in many LMICs; they are also involved in food service; carework), thus they might
be more directly exposed to the virus.

9.

High-Frequency Phone
Surveys - Random Digit
Dialing; Nationally
The Gendered Impacts of COVID-19 Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia,
on Labor Markets in Latin America
Costa Rica, Chile, Dominican Republic, representative sample of
individuals 18 and above with
and the Caribbean (Cucagna and
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
access to a phone: formal and
Romero, 2021)
Mexico, Peru, and Paragua
informal workers; women and
men (13,152 individuals)

10.

Phone surveys; Census-style
listing to create sample of
rural and urban adolescents
aged 12-21 years from preexisting panel study,
oversampling marginalized
adolescents, i.e adolescents
in refugee camp settings, with
disabilities or who
experienced child marriage
(~6,000 adolescents)

Adolescent Well-Being in the Time
of COVID-19 (Baird et al, 2020)

Bangladesh; Ethiopia; Jordan

Burkina Faso, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Djibouti, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Gabon,
Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Croatia,
Indonesia, Kenya, Cambodia, Lao
PDR, Madagascar, Mexico, Myanmar,
Mongolia, Malawi, Nigeria, Peru,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,
Romania, El Salvador, South Sudan,
Uganda, Uzbekistan, VIetnam, Zambia.

11.

The Short Term Impacts of COVID19 on Households in Developing
Countries: Overview Based on a
Harmonized Data Set of Highfrequency Surveys (Bundervoet et
al, 2021)

12.

Intersecting Vulnerabilities: The
Impacts of COVID‑19 on the
Psycho‑emotional Lives of Young
People in Low and Middle‑Income
Countries (Banati, Jones and
Youssef, 2020)

13.

Immediate Impact of Stay-At-Home
Orders to Control COVID-19
Transmission on Socioeconomic
Conditions, Food Insecurity, Mental
Bangladesh
Health, and Intimate Partner
Violence in Bangladeshi Women and
their Families: An Interrupted Time
Series (Hamadani et al, 2020)

Girls (but not boys) report increased exposure to intra-household tensions and violence in
all 3 countries (psychological and physical violence in Cote d'Ivoire; intra-family tentions
and problems in Lebanon); married girls report increased tensions and IPV in Lebanon
and in Ethiopia. Ethiopian adolescents report increased pressure to marry with school
closures - coinciding with traditional wedding season.

Phone Surveys; Random
sample of mothers of children
enrolled in previously enrolled Increase in emotional violence and physical violence during the lockdown (reported by
in an iron supplementation
20% and 6.5% respectively); lower prevalence of sexual violence but reports of increase
RCT (2,424 mothers)
since the lockdown for 51% of those affected (6.5%).

China

Unintended Consequences of
Lockdowns: COVID-19 and the
Shadow Pandemic (Ravindran and
Shah, 2020)

India

Administrative (NCW on
district-month level complaints
from January 2018–May
2020) and survey datasets
(NHFS from 2015-2016 and
Google data) (577 districts out
of 640)

Experiences Among Adults and
Adolescents during the COVID-19
Pandemic from Four Locations
Across Kenya (Abuya et al, 2020)

Kenya

15.

Kenya*

19.

Qualitative phone and inperson interviews of
adolescents sampled from
pre-existing panel study
(Rural/Urban; refugee camps;
with disabilities; married; in
education/out-of-education)
(568 adolescents)

No difference in terms of short-term (immediate shock caused by anti-pandemic policies)
impact of the lockdown/pandemic on family farms by age, gender, education but female
Online surveys of family farms owners received more shocks to resource allocations than male owners.
However, long-term impact (effects on long-term production plans) of the pandemic was
(2324 family crop farms)
differential by education and gender, as male-owned family farms are more diversified and
larger, thus better able to adjust in the face of risk such as COVID-19.

The Short- and Long-Term Impacts
of the COVID-19 Pandemic on
Family Farms in China – Evidence
From a Survey of 2 324 Farms (Du
et al, 2020)

18.

Phone surveys drawn via
RDD and pre-existing
nationally representative
Women were 9pp more likely to lose their job (42%, compared to 31% of men);
surveys. The total sample
women also more likely to report reductions in total household income in the aftermath of
consists of rural and urban
the pandemic.
households, and formal and
informal sector workers. (~46,
000 respondents)

Bangladesh

14.

17.

Pressure to marry has increased for adolescents in rural areas; but in urban areas,
economic fallout acted as a protective factor (42% of the urban sample in Bangladesh
reports that the pressure to marry has decreased). Older girls face substantial demands
on their time due to domestic and care work responsibilities - which limits their time for
leisure and study.

Phone Surveys; Sample from
pre-existing survey in UNFPA
districts and random sample
(480 girls) from existing
program targeting 2200
adolescent girls at risk of child
marriage in 5 high child
marriage districts (Bogura,
Jamalpur, Sherpur, Kushtia
and Chapainawabganj) (960
girls)

COVID-19-related Knowledge,
Attitudes, and Practices Among
Adolescent Girls in Bangladesh
(Amin et al, 2020)

16.

Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Lebanon

56% of women workers lost their jobs temporarily or permanently by May 2020 (+44%
compared to men workers). Employment remained unchanged even after individuals
started going back to work (by August 2020); in all countries, women are more likely than
men to face job losses: most female-intensive sectors observed the most job losses (56%
of losses concentrated in trade, personal services, education, and hospitality, employing
60% of women before the pandemic). Caregiving was a factor in women remaining
unemployment as the pandemic persisted (a child in school age results in a 6pp decrease
in likelihood of retaining a job for women but not for men, by August 2020 but not in May
2020). No sign of recovery among female workers by August 2020, only for lower-quality
jobs; distribution of women across job type also moving towards more self-employment
(+5pp) and less paid employees (-8pp)

Falling Living Standards During the
COVID-19 Crisis: Quantitative
Evidence from Nine Developing
Countries (Egger et al., 2021)

The Great Crime Recovery: Crimes
Against Women During, and After,
the COVID-19 Lockdown in Mexico
(Hoehn-Velasco et al 2021)

*Domestic violence module only
collected in Kenya but study covers 9
countries (Bangladesh, Nepal,
Philippines, Burkina Faso, Ghana,
Kenya, Sierra Leone, Rwanda,
Colombia)

Mexico

Phone Surveys; Samples of
urban households from
ongoing survey cohorts in 5
Nairobi informal settlements
(~1750 adults)

18% of the adolescent girls reported facing any form of violence in the past 2 weeks.
Married and older adolescents report higher levels of household violence (35% for married
girls compared to 16% for unmarried girls)
Adolescent girls report increased domestic responsibilities under lockdown: they reported
increased caretaking for ill family members (63% for girls aged 16 and above and 46% for
younger girls) and 22% of adolescent girls reported an increase in household chores
during lockdown.

Increase in domestic violence complaints by 0.47 sd (+131%), in cybercrime complaints by
0.7sd (+184%) concentrated in districtis with high intensity of lockdowns ("red zone
districts") compared to districts with low intensity of lockdowns in May 2020. Districts with
medium intensity of lockdowns saw smaller increases in cybercrime (0.12sd, +31%).
Overall, decrease in number of rape and sexual assault complaints by 0.4-0.6sd in April
and May 2020.
Long term effects of lockdowns show number of domestic violencecomplaints continue to
increase till July 2020, and decreases slightly between Aug and Feb 21 (although it is still
above pre-lockdown levels). Cybercrime, rape and sexual assault complaints reach prelockdown levels by November 2020.
Women more likely to experience violence (3pp) or tension (5pp) in their homes; 7% (5%)
of women (men) report more fear than their partner will harm them. Women are 13pp,
37pp and 31pp more likely to report doing more cooking, cleaning and childcare
respectively, compared to men.

Phone surveys drawn via
RDD and from pre-existing
studies. The total sample
consists of rural and urban
households, formal and
Increase in violence against women by 4% (0.3pp) and against children by 13% (2.6 pp),
informal sector workers,
during the crisis period (although these increases are not statistically significant).
agricultural laborers, small
business enterprises,
refugees, and migrants. (~30,
000 respondents)
Municipal level crime
incidents throughout Mexico
in 2019 and 2020; Data
comes from National public
Security System; data
comprises all municipalities in
Mexico, including 2457
municipalities Over Jan - Oct
for 2019 & 2020

Lapses in alimony, sexual crimes and domestic violence follow a U-shaped trend:
decrease during lockdown to a minimum and then begin to return to pre-COVID19 levels.
During the stay-at-home period (March to May 2020), overall crimes against women
declined by 20%, domestic violence fell by 20%, lapses in alimony by 59% and sexual
crimes by 28%. After 4 months, all crimes were back to pre-pandemic levels. Femicides
remain constant through the pandemic.

20.

Families under Confinement:
COVID-19 and Domestic Violence
(Silverio-Murillo et al, 2020)

Mexico (Mexico City)

21.

COVID-19 and the Rise of Intimate
Partner Violence (Agüero, 2021)

Peru

22.

The Gendered Effects of the COVID19 Crisis and Ongoing Lockdown in
South Africa: Evidence from NIDSSouth Africa
CRAM Waves 1 - 5 (Casale and
Shepherd, 2021)

23.

Household Response to an Extreme
Shock: Evidence on the Immediate
Impact of the COVID-19 Lockdown
Uganda
on Economic Outcomes and Wellbeing in Rural Uganda (Mahmud
and Riley, 2021)

* Summary may directly reference authors' own words in abstract and paper.

Calls for psychological violence and physical domestic violence increased by 17% and 7%
Domestic violence call-center respectively, whereas police reports of domestic violence decreased by 22%: COVID-19
calls and official police reports lockdown most likely prevented reporting of domestic violence even when violence
continued or increased. Domestic violence reports return to baseline levels by December
in Mexico City
2020.
Number of calls to the
High prevalence of domestic violence prior to COVID (60%) but increase in incidence of
helpline Linea 100 by
calls (+48%) after lockdown was imposed in Mid-March until July, with effects increasing
state from January 2007 to
over time between April and July. Findings robust to baseline characteristics, found in all
July 2020, adjusted by
states.
population size
Relative to men, women were more likely to lose their jobs during the initial lockdown
Phone surveys with a sample phase, and their recovery was slower as lockdowns eased. Women were less likely than
men to benefit from government income support during the lockdown. Women cited
of households drawn from a
childcare responsibilities as a constraint to their labor market activities more than men. By
pre-existing nationally
representative survey (5,862 March 2021, men's employment and working hours returned to pre-COVID levels, while
women's employment and working hours remained below the February 2020 baseline
respondents)
figures. Gender gaps in time spent on childcare and income support persist.
Phone survey of randomly
Respondents report an increase in perception of violence (# times a man acts violent
selected representative
towards his wife): +0.6 violent acts a month after the lockdown.
sample of rural households in
30% increase in likelihood of major argument with partner.
Uganda (1075 households)

